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ABSTRACT
The main strength of today’s international 
monetary system – its ﬂ  exibility and adaptability 
to the different needs of its users – can also 
become its weakness, as it may contribute to 
unsustainable growth models and imbalances. 
The global ﬁ  nancial crisis has shown that the 
system cannot afford a benign neglect of the 
global public good of external stability, and that 
multilateral institutions and fora such as the IMF 
and the G20 need to take the initiative to set 
incentives for systemically important economies 
to address real and ﬁ  nancial imbalances which 
impair stability. We draw this core conclusion 
from a systematic review of the literature on 
the current international monetary system, 
in particular its functioning and vulnerabilities 
prior to the global ﬁ  nancial crisis. Drawing from 
this analysis, we assess the existing and potential 
avenues, driven partly by policy initiatives and 
partly by market forces, through which the 
system may be improved.
JEL codes: F02, F21, F31, F32, F33, F34, F53, 
F55, F59, G15.
Key words: International monetary system, 
international liquidity, ﬁ  nancial  globalisation, 
global imbalances, capital ﬂ  ows, exchange rates, 
foreign reserves, surveillance, global ﬁ  nancial 
safety net, savings glut, Trifﬁ  n  dilemma, 
International Monetary Fund, Special Drawing 
Rights, G20.5
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The current international monetary system 
is highly ﬂ   exible in nature compared with 
past systems, as its functioning (e.g. supply of 
international liquidity, exchange rate and capital 
ﬂ  ow regimes, adjustment of external imbalances) 
adapts to the different economic conditions 
and policy preferences of individual countries. 
This ﬂ  exibility has facilitated a rapid expansion 
in world output and the most marked shift in 
relative economic power since the Second 
World War, accommodating the emergence of 
new economic actors and accompanying the 
transition of millions out of poverty. 
At the same time, a series of ﬁ  nancial crises in 
emerging market economies and, most recently, 
a major global crisis emanating from advanced 
economies have prompted several observers to 
ask whether the system’s adaptability harbours 
vulnerabilities. In particular, the main issuers 
and holders of international reserve currencies 
appear to be entwined in a symbiotic relationship 
accommodating each others’ domestic policy 
preferences. The pursuit of country-speciﬁ  c 
growth models that seek to maximise non-
inﬂ   ationary domestic growth over a short 
run perspective has led certain systemically 
important countries to pay insufﬁ  cient  regard 
to (i) negative externalities for other countries 
and/or (ii) longer-term macroeconomic and 
ﬁ   nancial stability concerns. This implies that 
uniquely domestically-focussed growth models 
may have played a part in the accumulation of 
unsustainable imbalances in a globalised world.
A rich body of literature produced in recent 
years has supported, from different angles, 
the (not undisputed) conclusion that this 
neglect of the longer-term impact of domestic 
policies was one of the root causes of the global 
ﬁ   nancial crisis. In a number of economies, 
monetary, exchange rate, ﬁ  scal and structural 
policies may have contributed – in combination 
with a number of shocks (e.g. Asian and 
dotcom crises) and long-standing factors 
(e.g. lack of welfare state in emerging market 
economies) – to a global glut of both liquidity 
and planned savings over investment. This was 
coupled with growing demand for safe ﬁ  nancial 
assets that far exceeded their availability, 
thereby exerting strong pressure on the ﬁ  nancial 
system of advanced economies such as the 
United States. The main symptoms of this 
vulnerable environment were the persistence of 
abnormally low risk premia and the accumulation 
of global imbalances. The latter included not 
only real imbalances in savings/investment and 
current account positions as mirrored in net 
capital ﬂ  ows, but also rising ﬁ  nancial imbalances 
(e.g. excessive credit expansion and asset 
bubbles) arising from aggressive risk-taking 
and soft budget constraints, in association 
with large-scale cross-border intermediation 
activity regardless of the sign and size of current 
account positions. This hazardous environment, 
together with inadequate regulation and 
supervision, provided the setting which fostered 
the well-known “micro” factors (e.g. poor 
ﬁ   nancial innovation, excessive leverage) that 
produced the immediate trigger of the crisis. 
Today, the domestic policy incentives in most 
key economies seem largely unchanged in spite 
of the global crisis. In this context, the real 
problem with the current international monetary 
system is not given by the particular national 
liability that serves as international currency, 
as some argue, but rather by the fact that the 
system does not embed sufﬁ  ciently  effective 
incentives for disciplining policies to help 
deliver “external stability”. External stability –
as it is referred to by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), or “sustainability”, 
in recent G20 language – is a notion closely 
intertwined with that of domestic stability; 
it can be deﬁ  ned as a global constellation of cross-
country real and ﬁ  nancial linkages which does 
not, and is not likely to, give rise to disruptive and 
painful adjustments in, for example, exchange 
rates, asset prices, output and employment. 
It can be regarded as a global public good, 
because it is both non-rivalrous (consumption by 
one does not reduce consumption possibilities 
for others) and non-excludable (no-one can be 6
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excluded from enjoying the beneﬁ  ts),  which 
typically leads to under-provision of the good. 
In practice, if external stability is assured, all 
countries beneﬁ  t from it; if not, all are likely 
to suffer from the incapability of the system 
to avert or remedy (“internalise”) the negative 
externalities of domestic policies.
In the absence of counterincentives to policy 
behaviour that undermines external stability, 
unsustainable growth models not only tend 
to fuel the credit and asset price booms that 
precede ﬁ  nancial crises – as was the case prior 
to the summer of 2007 and may well be the case 
in future – but might also, over the long run, 
undermine the conﬁ  dence that is the basis for 
the reserve asset status of national currencies. 
As a result, the pursuit of policies that are 
inconsistent with external stability may 
eventually lead, even in today’s world, to 
a contemporary version of the Trifﬁ  n dilemma. 
Given this general assessment, the core policy 
question then becomes: who provides what 
incentives for the promotion of external stability? 
We identify two major avenues: (1) cooperative 
policy actions, with the G20 as the leading 
forum for policy impulses and the IMF the main 
institution to promote implementation, alongside 
regional frameworks where possible; and 
(2) market-driven developments. These avenues 
are complementary and both are necessary, but 
the less the ﬁ  rst avenue is pursued, the greater 
the pain that the second avenue may bring about 
in the transition phase.
Starting with cooperative policy actions, while 
we examine all options currently debated or 
pursued (see Table 4 on p. 33), we are of the 
view that the most important measure is to 
improve the oversight of the system. This in turn 
has two major dimensions: risk identiﬁ  cation, 
and enhanced “traction”, especially for the 
systemically most important economies. 
In short, improved oversight requires 
(I) increasing the focus on cross-country 
linkages by strengthening not only multilateral 
(IMF and regional) surveillance but also the 
mutual assessment of policies of systemically 
important economies. As Raghuram Rajan 
put it, countries need to understand that if 
they want a platform from which to weigh 
upon the policies of others, they must allow 
others a platform to weigh upon their policies; 
(II) embedding external stability clearly and 
unambiguously in the heart of IMF and G20 
processes of risk identiﬁ  cation, including the 
deﬁ  nition of indicative guidelines against which 
persistently large imbalances are to be assessed. 
This would allow each country and currency 
area to indicate and offer up for scrutiny the 
whole package of policy measures – including 
greater exchange rate ﬂ  exibility where needed 
– that it intends to pursue in order to make its 
contribution to external stability over a realistic 
time horizon; (III) paying due attention to 
ﬁ  nancial imbalances and the macro-prudential 
dimension of oversight; and (IV) enhancing 
traction by understanding the root causes of 
poor implementation rates and addressing them 
with appropriate, often soft power, instruments. 
These may include persuasion, external 
assistance, peer pressure, even-handedness, 
transparency, direct involvement of top ofﬁ  cials, 
“comply or explain” procedures, greater 
independence and more inclusive governance 
of the IMF, as well as direct communication 
with – and enhanced accountability to – country 
(and world) citizens.
The system also requires a global  ﬁ  nancial 
safety net to tackle episodes of international 
contagion (akin to that following the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers), to be designed in such a 
way that it does not exacerbate moral hazard. 
This would help emerging market and 
developing economies in particular to deal 
with external shocks resulting in sudden stops 
in capital inﬂ  ows and the drying up of foreign 
currency liquidity. As a by-product, a global 
ﬁ  nancial safety net might also, over time and 
with experience, provide an incentive to reduce 
the unilateral accumulation of ofﬁ  cial reserves 
for self-insurance purposes. IMF assistance 
to cope with excessive capital ﬂ  ow  volatility 
would lean in the same direction.7
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Finally, more market-driven developments 
could also help to change the incentives for 
policy-makers. For instance, further progress 
in domestic ﬁ  nancial development in emerging 
market economies – as a result of both market 
forces and proper policy measures – would 
not only increase their resilience to changes 
in capital ﬂ  ows, but also create incentives for 
greater policy discipline in reserve currency 
issuers: the availability of credible investment 
alternatives would constrain the build-up of the 
excesses that characterised the pre-crisis years. 8
ECB
Occasional Paper No 123
February 2011
INTRODUCTION
A lively debate on the international monetary 
system (IMS) has developed in policy and 
academic circles over the past few years. Two 
broad groups of questions have stood out:
Do some features of the current IMS    •
contribute to the build-up of serious 
economic and ﬁ  nancial  imbalances 
that eventually result in disruptive and 
painful processes of market adjustment? 
In particularly, did the IMS contribute to the 
macroeconomic environment that facilitated 
the “micro” unfolding of the global ﬁ  nancial 
crisis which started in summer 2007? 
And, if the answer to these questions is “yes”,    •
to what extent are the ongoing initiatives 
to strengthen the IMS in response to the 
crisis changing it for the better? Are there 
reasons to believe that certain IMS-related 
risks remain unaddressed, which might sow 
the seeds for the next crisis? If so, what market 
developments and further policy initiatives and 
reforms are needed to strengthen the IMS?
The current debate on the IMS has generated a 
rich literature exploring, more speciﬁ  cally, 
whether (i) the characteristics of the current IMS 
give rise to incentives that promote the build-up 
of global imbalances, and if so, what are the 
implications for global stability; (ii) the 
persistence of the US dollar as the dominant 
international currency still implies an “exorbitant 
privilege” for the issuing country and/or a 
Trifﬁ  n-type dilemma for the IMS; 1 (iii) an IMS 
based on national reserve currencies should 
become more multipolar in nature or be 
complemented by a global supranational reserve 
currency; (iv) exchange rate anchoring and the 
accumulation of foreign assets by the ofﬁ  cial 
sector of emerging market economies present 
net costs or beneﬁ  ts; (v) the high global demand 
for safe debt instruments has put unsustainable 
pressure on the ﬁ  nancial system; and (vi) excess 
capital ﬂ  ow volatility and contagion stemming 
from external shocks can undermine the 
functioning of the IMS.
The replies to these questions remain very 
contentious and open in nature, but they are 
crucial to assessing the desirability of any policy 
measure regarding today’s IMS. The policy 
initiatives under discussion are wide-ranging, 
from enhanced surveillance to mutual policy 
assessment, from the introduction of a global 
ﬁ  nancial safety net to the promotion of domestic 
ﬁ   nancial development in emerging market 
economies, from calls for greater exchange rate 
ﬂ  exibility and lower unilateral accumulation of 
foreign reserves to changes in the international 
role of the special drawing rights (SDRs) of 
the IMF. 
This paper consists of two main sections. 
Section 1 puts forward a possible deﬁ  nition of 
the IMS and assesses the literature and policy 
debate on the current system and its link to 
global macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial  stability, 
thereby addressing some of the questions above. 
On the basis of this analysis, Section 2 discusses 
the possibilities for achieving a more stability-
oriented system that are being pursued or debated 
in the process of international cooperation, with 
particular emphasis on one avenue – improved 
oversight over countries’ policies in order to 
ensure IMS stability – which, in view of the 
IMS’s pliability, is essential and deserving of 
further attention and progress, as recognised by 
the work programmes of the G20 and the IMF. 
Note that this study is centred on how to improve 
the international monetary system. The main 
focus is on macroeconomic aspects, not ﬁ  nancial 
market reforms which, though crucial, go beyond 
the scope of this study. Also, the article focuses 
on crisis prevention rather than crisis resolution, 
though we acknowledge that crisis resolution 
arrangements (including regional arrangements, 
private sector involvement, etc.) may inﬂ  uence 
ex-ante market and sovereign behaviour. 
The “Trifﬁ  n dilemma” as formulated in Trifﬁ  n (1961) refers to  1 
the dilemma that the issuer of an international reserve currency 
may face if it is required to run repeated and large balance of 
payments deﬁ  cits in order to accommodate the global demand 
for reserves, while on the other hand seeking to preserve 
conﬁ  dence in its currency so that it retains its value (which is a 
key requirement for a reserve currency).  9
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1  THE LINK BETWEEN THE CURRENT 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM AND 
GLOBAL MACROECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL 
STABILITY
1.1  THE CONTOURS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY SYSTEM 
1.1.1 A SUGGESTED DEFINITION OF AN 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM
An international monetary system can 
be regarded as (i) the set of conventions, 
rules and policy instruments as well as 
(ii) the economic, institutional and political 
environment which determine the delivery 
of two fundamental global public goods: an 
international currency (or currencies) and 
external stability. The set of conventions, rules 
and policy instruments comprises, among other 
things, the conventions and rules governing 
the supply of international liquidity and the 
adjustment of external imbalances; exchange 
rate and capital ﬂ  ow regimes; global, regional 
and bilateral surveillance arrangements; and 
crisis prevention and resolution instruments. 
The economic, institutional and political 
environment encompasses, for example, a free 
trade environment; the degree of economic 
dominance of one or more countries at the 
“centre” of the system; the interconnectedness 
of countries with differing degrees of economic 
development; some combination of rules versus 
discretion and of supra-national institutions 
versus intergovernmental arrangements in the 
management of the system; and a given mix of 
cooperation and conﬂ  ict in the broader political 
environment. 
Regarding the two fundamental public goods, 
the  ﬁ   rst – an international currency or 
currencies – allows private and public-sector 
agents of different countries to interact in 
international economic and ﬁ  nancial activity by 
using them as a means of payment, a unit of 
account or a store of value. The second global 
public good –  external stability – refers to a 
global constellation of cross-country real and 
ﬁ   nancial linkages (e.g. current account and 
asset/liability positions) which is sustainable, 
i.e. does not, and is not likely to, give rise to 
disruptive and painful adjustments such as 
disorderly exchange rate and asset price swings 
or contractions in real output and employment.2
These two elements meet the deﬁ  nition  of 
global public good because they are – at the 
global level – non-rivalrous (consumption 
by one country does not reduce the amount 
available for consumption by another) and 
non-excludable (that is, it is not possible to 
prevent consumption of that good, whether or 
not the consumer has contributed to it), which 
creates a free-rider problem. This leads to an 
under-provision of the good, because there is 
no incentive to provide it – that is, the return to 
the provider is lower than the cost of providing 
the good. The implication is that if the IMS 
functions properly, all countries beneﬁ  t, but if it 
works badly, all countries are likely to suffer.3 
The two public goods provided by the IMS 
are intertwined, as depicted in Chart 1. The 
currency of a country or monetary union gains 
international status only if foreigners are willing 
to hold assets denominated in this currency, 
which requires the delivery of the second public 
good with respect to that currency: external 
stability. Market participants will accept to hold 
one or more international currencies only to the 
extent that they believe that the “core issuers” 
are pursuing policies that will ensure they can 
always repay their debts.
The notion of external stability is identiﬁ   ed by the IMF as  2 
the core objective of surveillance in its 2007 Decision on 
Bilateral Surveillance over Members’ Policies (IMF (2007b)). 
IMF (2010) further clariﬁ   es that “the Fund’s responsibility 
is narrowly cast over the international monetary system. 
This concept is limited to ofﬁ  cial arrangements relating to the 
balance of payments – exchange rates, reserves, and regulation 
of current payments and capital ﬂ  ows – and is different from 
the international ﬁ  nancial system. While the ﬁ  nancial sector is 
a valid subject of scrutiny, it is a second order activity, derived 
from the potential impact on the stability of the international 
monetary system.” Accordingly, in this paper we consider the 
international ﬁ  nancial system only to the extent that it impacts 
on IMS stability. At the same time, it should be stressed – as 
we do in Section 1.2 – that especially today it is very difﬁ  cult 
to disentangle the monetary from the ﬁ  nancial component, as in 
practice they are closely intertwined.
In the literature on the IMS, a similar use of the notion of “public  3 
good” can be found in, among others, Eichengreen (1987) and 
Camdessus (1999).10
ECB
Occasional Paper No 123
February 2011
This  circularity  may,  under  certain 
circumstances,  entail  some  tension  –  or  even 
a conﬂ  ict or dilemma – between the status of 
international  currency  and  external  stability. 
This is illustrated in Chart 1: 
From a monetary perspective, the main source 
of  liquidity  to  the  global  economy  is  the 
increase  in  the  gross  claims  denominated  in 
international  currencies.  However,  excessive 
global  liquidity  may  erode  conﬁ  dence  in  one 
or  more  international  currencies  if  associated 
with  unsound  policies  in  the  economies  that 
issue those currencies. This calls to mind the 
long-standing “Trifﬁ  n dilemma” (see footnote 1), 
although its dynamics look very different today 
from those in the Bretton Woods times (Trifﬁ  n 
1961), as discussed in Section 1.1.2.
From  a  balance-of-payments  perspective,  the 
same circularity may imply a tension between 
deﬁ  cit  “ﬁ  nancing”  and  “adjustment”:  the 
success of any IMS ultimately depends on the 
willingness  of  foreign  investors  to  ﬁ  nance 
the  core  issuers,  but  also  on  the  readiness 
of  borrowers  (i.e.  issuers)  to  adjust  possible 
imbalances  of  any  nature  if  and  when  they 
become unsustainable. This readiness presumes 
in turn two complementary elements. First, any 
adjustment has to be symmetric for the system 
to  work  properly;  hence  the  readiness  of  the 
currency issuer to adjust must be matched by the 
readiness of its creditor countries to adjust. And 
second, given that external imbalances are the 
mirror image of domestic imbalances, external 
adjustment  requires  –  sometimes  painful  – 
domestic adjustments (Bini Smaghi 2008).
There is no single way to address this possible – 
though not inevitable – tension between the two 
public goods, and indeed many different forms 
of IMS have existed over time. Some have put 
the emphasis on adjustment and restricted the 
availability of international money. Others have 
made it easier to create international liquidity 
and  ﬁ  nance  possible  imbalances,  thereby 
reducing the need for adjustment, thought this 
can put external stability at risk if the imbalances 
become too large. 
1.1.2 THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY SYSTEM IN COMPARISON 
WITH PAST SYSTEMS
The  current  IMS  took  shape  in  the  years 
following  the  Asian  crisis  (1997-98)  and  the 
advent of the euro (1999). This system can be 
seen  as  an  evolution  from  the  two  previous 
systems,  the  Bretton  Woods  system  of  ﬁ  xed 
exchange  rates  and  the  subsequent  system 
centred  on  three  major  ﬂ  oating  currencies 
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(the US dollar, Japanese yen and Deutsche 
Mark), on which Box 1 provides more detail. 
Its start was marked by two major developments. 
The ﬁ  rst was the materialisation of a revitalised 
US dollar area, encompassing the United States 
and a new group of key creditors which, unlike 
in the previous phase, had become systemically 
important: namely, certain economies in 
emerging East Asia – especially China – and 
the Gulf oil exporters. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau 
and Garber (2003) labelled this arrangement the 
“revived Bretton Woods” or “Bretton Woods 
II”. We will in turn refer to the current IMS as 
the “mixed” system, to highlight the assortment 
of ﬂ  oating and ﬁ  xed currency regimes of its core 
actors. The second development was the advent 
of a major monetary union with a new globally 
important ﬂ  oating currency, the euro, which – 
despite some weaknesses inherent in its status 
as a “currency without a state” – has rapidly 
become a credible alternative to the US dollar, 
though without undermining its central role in 
the IMS.
A core feature of the mixed system is that, in 
contrast to the Bretton Woods system, there 
are  no longer any rule-based restrictions 
(e.g. a link to gold) on the supply of international 
liquidity. It should be noted that, under the 
current IMS, the supply of international liquidity 
does not necessarily require the accumulation 
of current account imbalances, as predicted 
by the Trifﬁ  n dilemma. This deserves mention 
because until 2006-07 the supply of US dollars 
was associated with US current account 
deﬁ   cits that were high and rising (Chart 2). 
Owing to global ﬁ   nancial markets, however, 
reserve-issuing countries should be able to 
provide the rest of the world with safe and 
liquid assets while investing in less liquid and 
longer-term assets abroad for similar amounts. 
This would result in maturity transformation in 
the ﬁ  nancial account of the balance of payments 
while maintaining a balanced current account 
or, at any rate, a sustainable current account 
deﬁ  cit/surplus (Mateos y Lago, Duttagupta and 
Goyal (2009)). By looking at gross in addition 
to net assets and liabilities, it is also possible 
to gauge the importance of other actors in the 
current IMS, namely the ﬁ  nancially  mature 
advanced economies, which are engaged in 
large-scale cross-border intermediation activity 
regardless of the sign of their net capital ﬂ  ows, 
i.e. their current account (Borio and Disyatat 
2010). This is a very important and often 
overlooked aspect as external stability depends 
on the sustainability not only of the current 
account (i.e. the savings/investment positions) 






















1953 1958 1963 1968 1973  1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 
Bretton Woods system “Flexible” system “Mixed” system 
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis, Global Financial Data and ECB calculations.
Notes: For a description of the two previous systems and of the present “mixed” system, see Box 1 and Section 1.1.2., respectively. 12
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but also of gross capital ﬂ  ow patterns and the 
underlying asset/liability positions (see Broner, 
Didier, Erce and Schmukler (2010) for an 
analysis of the importance of gross ﬂ  ows from 
the 1970s until the present day). Today more than 
ever, the stability of the IMS is closely related 
to the stability of the international ﬁ  nancial 
system through this nexus. And indeed many 
prefer to talk about an international monetary 
and  ﬁ  nancial  system, given the difﬁ  culty  of 
disentangling the two elements.
If the accumulation of imbalances under the 
current IMS is not intrinsic to the supply of 
international liquidity, which other feature 
of this system has given rise to them? In our 
view, the mark of the mixed system is that, 
unlike the Bretton Woods system, it does not 
embed sufﬁ  ciently effective policy-driven or 
market-driven disciplining devices to ensure 
external stability – the second public good that 
an IMS ought to deliver. 
First, many have argued that there is a bias in a 
number of systemically relevant countries to 
accumulate unsustainable current account 
imbalances in the medium to long run (external 
real imbalances). In the main issuer of 
international currency, the United States, 
the tendency to accumulate deﬁ  cits has reﬂ  ected, 
among other factors, stimuli to domestic demand 
based on easy credit in normal times and strong 
macroeconomic support in crisis times. This has 
been also possible because global investors have 
been willing to provide ﬁ   nancing to the 
United States through unconstrained accumulation 
of US dollar assets, given the scarcity of equally 
credible alternatives.4 In so doing, they have acted 
as the “bankers of the United States”, turning on 
its head the constellation which prevailed under 
the Bretton Woods system, when the United 
States acted as banker of the world. This ﬁ  nancing 
has not always been driven purely by market 
considerations, but also by government 
decisions – such as the maintenance of de jure or 
de facto pegs to the US dollar in the face of 
appreciation pressures on the domestic currency, 
leading to reserve accumulation on a scale going 
beyond purely precautionary motives. 
In this context, a problem arises when the 
core issuers and main accumulators of reserve 
currencies fail to adopt sustainable models of 
growth and instead follow models – leading to 
over-consumption in the former and over-saving 
in the latter (domestic real imbalances) – which 
help fuel the booms that precede ﬁ  nancial 
crises. The ensuing indebtedness of the reserve 
issuers – or, within the more balanced euro area, 
of individual members of the Monetary Union 
as long as it lacks a proper architecture for crisis 
prevention and resolution – may over the long 
run undermine the conﬁ  dence that is the basis 
for the reserve asset status, according to Mateos 
y Lago et al. (2009). This is the classic “Trifﬁ  n 
dilemma” revisited. In the words of Gourinchas 
and Rey (2005), “Trifﬁ   n’s analysis does not 
have to rely on the gold-dollar parity to be 
relevant. Gold or not, the spectre of the Trifﬁ  n 
dilemma may still be haunting us!”
In the current IMS, however, focusing on real 
imbalances is not sufﬁ  cient to understand the 
causes of the global ﬁ  nancial crisis. By extending 
the analysis of ﬁ  nancing dynamics from net to 
gross capital ﬂ  ows, it is evident that prior to the 
crisis European banks played a key role in the 
external funding of the credit boom that occurred 
in the United States (see Whelan, 2010). 
This raises the complementary issue (reviewed 
in Section 1.2.4) of whether today’s IMS has 
become too elastic, i.e. lacking “anchors … that 
can prevent the overall expansion of … external 
funding from fuelling the unsustainable build-up 
of ﬁ  nancial imbalances”, regardless of whether 
such imbalances are coupled with savings/
investment and current account (i.e. real) 
imbalances or not. Financial imbalances are 
the outcome of too soft budget constraints on 
the private and ofﬁ   cial sector, and are here 
deﬁ   ned as “overstretched balance sheets that 
support unsustainable expenditure patterns, 
be these across expenditure categories and 
sectors, … current account positions or in the 
aggregate” (both quotations from Borio and 
Disyatat, 2010).
The expressions “exorbitant privilege” and “dollar trap” have  4 
been coined to depict this situation from the viewpoints of the 
United States and its creditors respectively.13
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All in all, it appears that, at least until the onset 
of the ﬁ  nancial crisis, the main actors in the 
IMS paid no regard to the provision of external 
stability that should have been safeguarded by 
(i) the adjustment of external/domestic real 
imbalances and (ii) anchors such as not too loose 
monetary policies preventing the accumulation 
of unsustainable ﬁ  nancial imbalances. A number 
of intertwined factors drove this benign neglect 
of global imbalances under the mixed system 
until the ﬁ  nancial crisis. These factors overrode 
the early warnings that had emanated from the 
IMF-led multilateral consultations (2006-07) 
and repeatedly from G7 and G20 statements, 
Annual Reports of the Bank for International 
Settlements and elsewhere. They were also not 
stymied by IMF surveillance exercises which, 
following the 2007 Decision on Bilateral 
Surveillance over Members’ Policies, were 
focused on securing external stability. These 
driving factors included (see Section 1.2 for 
analytical detail):
The view, increasingly popular until    –
2007, that global imbalances were just 
the endogenous outcome of optimising 
market forces and structural developments, 
implying that external and balance sheet 
positions should not become policy targets. 
In particular, the apparent sustainability of 
the mixed system was attributed to ﬁ  nancial 
innovation, ﬁ  nancial account liberalisation, 
a declining home bias all over the world and 
persistent differences in the level of ﬁ  nancial 
development between mature and emerging 
market economies. It was maintained that 
these features favoured the channelling of 
savings from surplus to deﬁ  cit economies – 
especially the United States given the 
international role of the US dollar and the 
higher liquidity of US ﬁ  nancial  markets 
compared with those of other advanced 
economies, such as the euro area.
Mutual strategic dependence between    –
the United States and China not only in 
the economic but also in the political and 
military ﬁ  elds (Paulson 2008).
The belief that the competitiveness problem    –
posed by intra-euro area imbalances was 
purely “internal” in nature, without causing 
any downside risks to ﬁ  nancial  stability. 
Moreover, most governments in the euro 
area were playing down the importance of 
ﬁ  scal discipline and regional surveillance in 
a monetary union, with market participants 
endorsing this by under-pricing sovereign 
risk until the 2010 European sovereign 
debt crisis.
Most importantly of all, economic policies 
under the mixed system were, and to a large 
extent still are, shaped by a system of incentives. 
Three incentives are highlighted below.
First, certain countries with a ﬂ  oating currency, 
primarily the United States, and certain 
countries with a managed currency, especially 
China, had several domestic incentives that 
led them to ignore the implicit “rules” of the 
adjustment mechanism (see Rajan (2010) for 
a thorough analysis). This led to a conﬂ  ict 
between short-term internal policy objectives 
and preserving external/domestic stability – a 
conﬂ   ict which, at least until the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, was usually resolved in favour of the 
short-term internal policy objectives. Chart 3 
brieﬂ  y summarises the system of incentives 
in the bilateral relations between the two core 
actors of the mixed system.
A second, related incentive was that short-term 
oriented macro policy stimuli were producing 
results prior to the onset of the crisis. 
The economies making the largest contribution 
to external imbalances (e.g. the United States, 
China and Russia) were until 2007 also those 
outperforming comparable countries in terms 
of real GDP growth, without engendering 
inﬂ   ationary pressures. Interestingly, the 
correlation between output growth and the size 
of the current account imbalance was much 
higher in these economies than elsewhere: as a 
rule, the more that their actual growth 
outstripped trend growth, the higher were, as a 
by-product, their trade and current account 14
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imbalances (Dorrucci and Brutti 2007). In view 
of  this  growth  performance,  policy  makers 
would  have  faced  opposition  in  proposing  a 
shift to a more sustainable and medium-term-
oriented  growth  path.  Alan  Greenspan 
(Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board at 
the  time)  observed  that  “the  trade  deﬁ  cit  is 
basically a reﬂ  ection of the fact that the whole 
world  is  basically  expanding”  (Greenspan, 
2006).  Henry  Paulson  (then  US  Treasury 
Secretary)  captured  the  short-term  dilemma 
between imbalances and growth in the United 
States  by  stating:  “The  trade  balance  is  a 
problem … but the current situation is better 
than no deﬁ  cit and no growth at the same time”.5 
He did not mention, however, the longer-term 
dilemma  between  imbalances,  ﬁ  nancial 
stability and, ultimately, growth (as discussed 
in Section 1.2).
Finally,  imbalances  within  the  euro  area 
were allowed to grow because some members 
believed  themselves  (mistakenly  in  hindsight) 
to  be  shielded  from  the  repercussions  of  lax 
domestic  policies  and  poor  ﬁ  nancial  market 
regulation.  Markets  encouraged  them  in  their 
belief by largely ignoring sovereign risk within 
the  euro  area  and  ﬁ  nancing  the  public  and 
private  sectors  in  certain  euro  area  countries 
at  relatively  low  interest  rates.  In  the  event, 
intra-euro area surveillance was not sufﬁ  ciently 
effective as it too fell victim to the belief that 
divergences  in  countries’  external  positions 
were benign in a monetary union in the same 
way as they were considered to be benign at the 
global level (Bini Smaghi 2010a).
Quotation  from  “Financial  Times  Deutschland”  (translated),  5 
1 June 2006, p. 18.
Chart 3 The two core actors in the mixed system and their policy incentives
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THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR UNTIL THE LATE 1990S: 
A BRIEF OVERVIEW
The Bretton Woods system (1944-1973)
The Bretton Woods system was a formal international monetary system based on very transparent 
and predictable rules as well as on a US dollar that was “as good as gold”. The system’s key 
feature was that currencies were pegged to the US dollar and the US dollar in turn represented 
a ﬁ  xed amount of gold. Hence, the supply of international liquidity – deﬁ  ned at that time as 
gold and reserve currencies – was restricted by the link to gold. And it was exactly because of 
this feature that external imbalances adjusted. An important feature was that adjustments took 
place through changes in quantities, namely a correction in domestic demand in both deﬁ  cit and 
surplus countries. Adjustments through prices, i.e. exchange rate realignments, while possible, 
rarely happened.
Using the exchange rate as a channel of adjustment was, however, always a temptation. Faced 
with large shocks, it offered a potentially more palatable option than lengthy and costly internal 
adjustment. At the end of the 1960s, the largest of all shocks – the Vietnam War – eventually led 
to the collapse of the system. Its ﬁ  nancing in the United States was associated with expansionary 
policies that in turn resulted in high inﬂ  ationary pressures. In the course of the 1960s, US dollar-
denominated reserve assets lost 40% of their purchasing power. As a result, the creditors to the 
United States, mainly Germany and Japan, became increasingly reluctant to ﬁ  nance the war by 
accumulating reserves denominated in US dollars.
In consequence, the Bretton Woods system eventually collapsed as the core country was 
insufﬁ  ciently committed to abiding by the rules, which meant maintaining the value of the US 
dollar in terms of gold. It should be remarked, however, that the composition and the magnitude 
of the US balance of payments imbalance was not problematic per se. The US current account 
remained in healthy surplus between the early 1950s and the late 1970s (see Chart 2). Rather, 
the imbalance consisted mainly of large long-term capital outﬂ  ows from the United States, 
especially foreign direct investment by US multinationals, as the US acted as the “banker of the 
world”. It imported short-term capital in the form of bank deposits and Treasury bills and bonds, 
and exported longer-term capital. The resultant accumulation of net long-term foreign assets by 
the United States reassured foreign investors, and hence the system did not collapse because of 
excessive US indebtedness.
The post-Bretton Woods phase (1973-1998): the “Flexible system”
After the Bretton Woods system an informal, market-led system evolved, which was centred 
on three ﬂ  oating currencies, the US dollar, the Japanese yen and the Deutsche Mark (the “G3”). 
There was another new ingredient to it: a gradual liberalisation of cross-border capital movements 
due to the growing recognition of markets’ positive role in the international allocation of savings. 
Owing to the ﬂ  oating currencies and freer movement of capital, it was expected that the ﬁ  nancing 
and adjustment of external imbalances between the United States, Japan and Germany would 
happen quasi-automatically. Market forces were expected to exert the necessary discipline on 
economies, and force policy-makers to adopt adjustment measures when needed.16
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1.2  THE DEBATE ON THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM IN THE 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
1.2.1 OVERVIEW
There is widespread agreement that the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis was both triggered and propagated by 
failures within the ﬁ  nancial system. More open, 
however, remains the debate on its underlying 
causes. Bearing in mind that one-size-ﬁ  ts-all 
explanations fail to reﬂ   ect the complexity of 
what happened, we focus here on the lively 
debate about the role played by the IMS. 
Various studies, outlined in Table 1, support 
the conclusion that way in which the IMS 
functioned was, directly or indirectly, one of 
the root causes. Speciﬁ   c contributions focus 
on different aspects but, taken together, can – 
despite different emphases and some mutual 
inconsistency – provide policy-makers with a 
“macro” narrative of the crisis that complements 
the “micro” (ﬁ  nancial sector based) narrative. 
In brief, the story told by these contributions is 
the following, as also depicted in Chart 4:
With the beneﬁ  t of hindsight, we can say that this system worked to a certain extent. Its basic 
features – free-ﬂ  oating currencies and free capital ﬂ  ows – are still with us today. But the system 
did not always function smoothly. There were several major episodes of excessive volatility 
among the three major currencies– and even episodes when these currencies were clearly 
misaligned, which prompted unilateral and/or concerted central bank intervention in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Moreover, it became apparent that exchange rate adjustment, while necessary, did 
not by itself lead to the complete adjustment of global imbalances.
It should be stressed that this system was ﬂ  exible only at its centre, i.e. between the “G3” 
currencies and those of a few other advanced economies. At its periphery, small open economies, 
advanced and emerging alike, often needed a strong nominal anchor. They opted for more or 
less heavily managed exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar or, in Europe, the Deutsche Mark. 
However, this very often produced (temporary) periods of calm interspersed by (sometimes 
severe) disruptions, as the many currency crises experienced in the 1980s and 1990s, notably in 
emerging market economies, conﬁ  rm.
Chart 4 Root causes of the financial crisis: one interpretation
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Table 1 Literature on the macro and structural root causes of the financial crisis, 
partly related to the functioning of the IMS
Strand of literature Key point made  Some references (not exhaustive)
Savings glut, investment 
drought
Planned savings, exceeding investment at the global 
level, inundated ﬁ  nancial markets because of both 
a glut in gross savings and a drought in investment. 
“Too much capital chasing too little investment” 
contributed to the low-yield environment and the real 
interest rate conundrum prior to the crisis.1)
- Bernanke (2005) 
- IMF (2005) 
- Trichet (2007) 
- Bean (2008) 
- Rajan (2010)
Safe assets imbalance The world had (and still has) insatiable demand for safe 
debt instruments that put strong pressure on the US 
ﬁ  nancial system and its incentives. This view, while 
linked to the savings-glut literature (since both contain 
the idea that creditor countries demanded ﬁ  nancial 
assets in excess of the capacity to produce them), 
emphasises the notion that the safe assets imbalance is 
particularly acute because emerging markets have very 
limited institutional ability to produce such assets.
- Caballero (2006, 2009a and b) 
-   Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2007) 
- Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008) 
- Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009)
Liquidity glut US policy rates in the 2000s have been consistently 
below the levels predicted by the Taylor rule, i.e. below 
what historical experience would suggest they should 
have been, thereby contributing to the low-yield 
environment and declining risk aversion.
- Taylor (2007 and 2009) 
-   Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
(2008)
Since it is monetary policy that ultimately sets the 
price of leverage, excessively loose monetary policies 
contributed to credit expansion and an excessive 
elasticity of the international monetary and ﬁ  nancial 
system. Low policy rates worldwide reﬂ  ected the 
interplay of very low global inﬂ  ation and the belief 
that monetary policy was about containing consumer 
price inﬂ  ation, not asset price inﬂ  ation.
- Borio and Disyatat (2010) 
- Borio (2009) 
-   Borio and Drehmann (2008 and 2009)
Alessi and Detken (2008)  
There is a link between liquidity glut, global 
imbalances and the low-yield environment
- Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) 
- Bracke and Fidora (2008) 
- Barnett and Straub (2008) 
- Bems, Dedola and Smets (2007)
Reserve accumulation and 
capital ﬂ  owing “uphill” 
Reserve accumulation and, more generally, capital 
ﬂ  owing “uphill” (i.e., from developing and emerging 
market economies to more mature economies) 
contributed signiﬁ  cantly to the compression of bond 
yields and to the United States' ability to borrow 
cheaply abroad, thereby ﬁ  nancing a housing bubble.
- Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) 
-   Literature reviewed in Eurosystem (2006) 
- Warnock and Warnock (2007)
Insufﬁ  cient implementation 
of structural policies as 
another key contributor to the 
preconditions for the crisis
The materialisation of excess savings and the fact 
that they were reinvested abroad by the ofﬁ  cial 
sector was partly attributable to structural factors 
such as (i) the propensity of residents of certain 
high growth developing countries to accumulate 
precautionary savings in the absence of welfare 
provision, (ii) demographic factors, (iii) ﬁ  nancial 
underdevelopment and (iv) in China, corporate 
governance issues that induce ﬁ  rms to retain too high 
a proportion of savings. Some of these structural 
factors could have been addressed by proper policies 
implemented over sufﬁ  ciently long time horizons.
-   Bracke, Bussière, Fidora and Straub 
(2008)
-   Dorrucci, Meyer-Cirkel and Santabárbara 
(2009)
Link between macro root 
causes of the ﬁ  nancial crisis 
and the unfolding of the micro 
causes
Various explanations (e.g. according to Caballero, 
when the demand for safe assets began to rise above 
what the US ﬁ  nancial system could naturally provide, 
ﬁ  nancial institutions started to search for ways to 
generate low-risk, preferably triple-A-rated assets out of 
riskier products. Complex, securitised and highly-rated 
instruments were created, which in the event were 
vulnerable to default from a systemic shock)
- Caballero (2009a and b)
- Coval et al. (2009)
- Trichet (2009a and b)




1) For a contrarian view, see Hume and Sentance (2009).18
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As with any system under strain, it is the 
symptoms that signal there is a problem. In the 
IMS prior to the crisis, the warning signs of 
escalating systemic risk were primarily twofold: 
on the price side, historically low risk premia 
and, on the quantity side, the accumulation of 
global imbalances as deﬁ  ned in Section 1.1.2. 
The low-yield environment and the “benign 
neglect” by policy makers of the mounting 
global imbalances under the current IMS played 
a key role in producing “the ﬂ  ood of money 
lapping at the door of borrowers” (Rajan 2010). 
This resulted in overstretched household and 
bank balance sheets and fuelled the under-
pricing of risks and over-pricing of assets, 
especially in housing markets. It also encouraged 
the development of complex ﬁ  nancial products 
that were hard to assess for risk management 
purposes. More generally, there was a 
widespread deterioration in lending standards 
and credit quality, increased leveraging activity 
and burgeoning ﬁ  nancial intermediation.
The core macroeconomic conditions that gave 
rise to the low-yield environment and growing 
global imbalances were set by a global excess 
of planned savings over investment (further 
discussed in upcoming Section 1.2.3) as well 
as of liquidity (see upcoming Section 1.2.4), 
coupled with strong global demand for, and 
insufﬁ  cient supply of, safe and liquid ﬁ  nancial 
assets (Section 1.2.5).
As we will illustrate, the savings/liquidity glut 
was to a signiﬁ   cant extent also the outcome 
of macroeconomic and structural policies 
which – in the absence of policy attention on 
external stability in the current IMS – reinforced 
or insufﬁ   ciently countered the effects of a 
combination of shocks and structural/cyclical 
factors on saving/investment, current accounts 
and ﬁ  nancial imbalances.
Although the form, timing and sequencing of the 
crisis had not been fully anticipated, there was 
nonetheless widespread awareness among policy-
makers that the macroeconomic conditions for 
some form of disorderly adjustment of house 
and asset prices, exchange rates and balance 
of payments positions were in place (Visco, 
2009a and b). Since the crisis, the domestic 
incentives underlying the macroeconomic and 
structural policies of the main participants in 
the IMS have not fundamentally changed and 
once again, economic policies appear to be 
more inﬂ  uenced by short-term goals than the 
objective of balanced and sustainable growth 
(see e.g. Bini Smaghi, 2008; Blanchard and 
Milesi-Ferretti, 2009; Visco, 2009 a and b; and 
Rajan, 2010).
The literature on the IMS and the ﬁ  nancial crisis 
is reviewed in the next four sections. We ﬁ  rst 
focus on the debate regarding the role played by 
the US dollar as an international currency during 
the crisis, i.e. on the ﬁ  rst of the aforementioned 
IMS public goods, (in Section 1.2.2). We then 
review the debates surrounding the savings glut 
(Section 1.2.3), the liquidity glut (Section 1.2.4) 
and related policy failures. Finally, turning to 
the role of more structural factors, we focus on 
the literature regarding asymmetric ﬁ  nancial 
globalisation (Section 1.2.5).
1.2.2 THE RECENT LITERATURE ON THE US 
DOLLAR, THE “EXORBITANT PRIVILEGE” 
AND THE TRIFFIN DILEMMA
Three interpretations of the role played by 
the US dollar in the ﬁ  nancial crisis and, more 
generally, in the prevailing IMS can be identiﬁ  ed 
in the literature. In overview, according to the 
ﬁ  rst interpretation, the crisis was driven solely 
by “micro” failures in the ﬁ  nancial system; the 
international role and status of the US dollar 
was and will remain unchallenged. Under the 
opposite view, the role played by the dollar in 
the IMS would have precipitated the crisis, and 
the world can no longer rely on an international 
currency issued by a single country. 
An intermediate view – broadly shared by the 
authors – is that the nature of the IMS contributed 
to the macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial environment 
that gave rise to the crisis. It was not the supply 
of international currency by the United States as 
such that was the problem; but rather the lack 
of policy-disciplining devices aimed at fostering 
external stability. In the words of Kregel (2010), 
“the basic problem is not the particular national 19
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liability that serves as the international currency 
but rather the failure of an efﬁ  cient adjustment 
mechanism for global imbalances”. These three 
views are now explored in more detail.
ONE VIEW: UNCHALLENGED DOLLAR 
IN AN UNCHALLENGED IMS 
According to this view, the nature of the current 
IMS was “at best, an indirect contributor to the 
build up of systemic risk”, whereas “the main 
culprit (…) must be seen as deﬁ  cient regulation” 
(IMF 2009a). Proponents argue that net capital 
ﬂ   ows to the United States were a stabilising 
rather than destabilising force even at the peak 
of the crisis, and point out, as evidence, that 
the United States did not and has not since 
experienced external funding problems. Also, 
on the empirical front, they note that there is no 
evidence that any of the features in the current 
IMS led to the build-up in vulnerabilities prior 
to the crisis (IMF 2009b).
The advocates of this view tend to lay emphasis on 
the post-Lehman episode of US dollar appreciation 
described in Box 2, and stress that one of its 
most unusual features was the extent to which 
the US dollar remained relatively immune to an 
extraordinarily severe ﬁ  nancial  crisis  originating 
in the issuing country. As risk aversion rose 
rapidly and a widespread process of deleveraging 
began, the ﬂ   ight to safety and liquidity led to 
a sharp appreciation of the dollar, and the US 
current account deﬁ   cit began shrinking, not as 
a result of a fall in capital ﬂ  ows, but owing to a 
contraction in aggregate demand brought on by 
domestic  ﬁ   nancial problems (combined with a 
collapse in world trade and world oil prices).
More generally, this view stresses that the 
international predominance of the dollar remains 
unchallenged. For instance, in the literature it is 
highlighted that the dollar:
remains a central currency in the exchange rate    •
regimes of third countries (see e.g. evidence 
in Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008);
still accounts for the largest share of foreign    •
currency reserves reported to the IMF, 
although it declined from almost 73% in 
mid-2001 to 61.5% in the ﬁ   rst quarter of 
2010. (It should be noted, however, that this 
decline mostly reﬂ  ects dollar depreciation, 
which raised the value of other currencies in 
reserve portfolios, see Goldberg, 2009; After 
adjusting for exchange rate ﬂ  uctuations, 
the drop in the US dollar share occurs only 
after 2007 and turns out to be much less 
pronounced, see Table 2);
is used in international trade, especially in    •
the East Asia-Paciﬁ  c region and in primary 
commodities trading, to a degree well beyond 
what would be commensurate with trade with 
the United States (Goldberg and Tille, 2009);
is by far the main currency in foreign exchange    •
market turnover (BIS, 2007 and 2010), and 
has declined only slightly in international 
ﬁ  nancial markets as currency of denomination 
of debt securities issued outside countries’ 
own borders. In particular, the dollar remains 
the primary ﬁ  nancing currency for issuers in 
the Asia-Paciﬁ  c region, Latin America and 
the Middle East (ECB, 2009).




2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
USD 60.8 63.4 65.1 63.0 63.9 64.7 63.3 62.2 60.2
EUR 29.6 27.6 25.9 27.7 26.8 25.9 27.0 27.3 28.4
JPY 5.1 4.4 4.2 4.3 3.9 3.6 3.0 3.0 3.1
GBP 2.6 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.5 3.8 4.4 4.3 4.6
Other 1.9 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.3 3.2 3.7
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations.
Note: Constant exchange rate ﬁ  gures have been computed using the last available quarter as the base period.20
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Several reasons have been put forward to 
explain the international dominance of the 
US dollar, including inertia effects, network 
externalities, the unrivalled size and liquidity 
of US ﬁ  nancial markets, and the fact that most 
emerging market economies, now key actors in 
world trade and the most important contributors 
to global output growth, still have much less 
developed  ﬁ   nancial sectors (see upcoming 
Section 1.2.5). In particular, when emerging 
economy central banks and sovereign 
wealth funds started accelerating the pace of 
accumulation of foreign assets, about ten years 
ago, they had few alternatives to investing in 
the safe assets of mature economies, mostly in 
the United States.
THE OPPOSITE VIEW: THE “TRIFFIN DILEMMA” 
At the opposite end of the spectrum of views, a 
number of authors, including Governor Zhou 
of the People's Bank of China (2009), have 
argued that the recent ﬁ  nancial crisis has to be 
understood against the backdrop of inherent 
vulnerabilities in the existing IMS. According 
to this strand of the literature, the main issuer of 
international currency, the United States, can only 
satisfy the global demand for liquidity if it overly 
stimulates domestic demand, but this is likely to 
lead ultimately to debt accumulation, which in 
turn will eventually undermine the credibility if 
the international currency, and hence its status as 
a reserve currency. This is the already mentioned 
“Trifﬁ   n dilemma”. Indeed, proponents of this 
view argue that the reserve issuer has a tendency 
to create excess liquidity in global markets, 
thereby leading the international currency to 
depreciate over the longer run. 
In this interpretation the emphasis is put 
on the alleged tendency of the US dollar to 
depreciate over the longer run, rather than on 
the post-Lehman episode. The main conclusion 
is that “the Trifﬁ  n Dilemma (i.e., the issuing 
countries of reserve currencies cannot maintain 
the value of the reserve currencies while 
providing liquidity to the world) still exists” 
(Zhou, 2009): while the current account 
deﬁ  cits experienced by the United States since 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system 
are seen as the main source of creation of 
international liquidity, it is argued that such 
deﬁ  cits progressively erode conﬁ  dence in the 
US dollar as an international currency. 
The conclusion drawn by this strand of the 
literature is, therefore, that the global economy 
cannot, and hence should not, rely any longer on 
a currency issued by a single country. Instead, a 
substitute, non-national, international currency 
is needed.
INTERMEDIATE VIEW 
Under this heading, the basic proposition is that 
the current IMS is not inherently ﬂ  awed, and that 
it can be maintained as long as reserve issuers and 
holders conduct sound, medium-term-oriented 
policies for well-balanced growth. 
First of all, it is argued (unlike under the 
“traditional Trifﬁ  n view”) that global ﬁ  nancial 
markets make it possible for reserve-issuing 
countries to provide safe and liquid assets to 
the rest of the world while investing a similar 
amount of assets abroad, and hence maintain 
sustainable current account positions. Therefore, 
according to this view, the accumulation of 
global imbalances in recent years (i) is not 
necessary for the functioning of the current IMS 
and (ii) does not, in itself, provide a rationale 
for ﬁ  nding a substitute for the US dollar as the 
dominant reserve currency. Indeed, a number of 
authors (see Habib, 2010, most recently) have 
provided evidence that, thanks to strong returns 
on net foreign assets and favourable valuation 
effects, the international investment position of 
the United States is more sustainable than one 
would infer from the past accumulation of US 
current account deﬁ  cits. 
This is not to deny that under the current IMS, 
problems may arise from the insufﬁ  cient 
availability of international currency. In particular, 
major external shocks (e.g. such as that of the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers) may produce 
unsustainable capital ﬂ   ow volatility, especially 
for emerging market economies, that disrupts the 
smooth functioning of the IMS. Addressing this 
problem calls for the enhancement of domestic 21
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ﬁ  nancial systems in emerging market economies 
as well as the global “ﬁ   nancial safety net” 
(deﬁ  ned as the system of multilateral, regional 
and bilateral facilities which aims to cushion 
the contagion ensuing from major external 
shocks). These measures would not require a 
major overhaul of the IMS but could be actively 
pursued within the current system (as discussed 
ahead in, Section 2.2.1)
However, proponents of the intermediate view 
identify a link between the functioning of the 
IMS and the ﬁ  nancial crisis. This link is given 
by the inadequacy of policy-disciplining devices 
inherent in the IMS (as already mentioned 
in Section 1.2), which we now examine in 
analytical detail in the next three sections on 
the savings glut, the liquidity glut and uneven 
ﬁ  nancial globalisation. 
Box 2
THE COURSE OF THE US DOLLAR DURING THE MOST CRITICAL PHASE OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The period between September 2008 (collapse of Lehman Brothers) and early 2010 was 
characterised by an extraordinary episode of rise and fall in the US dollar (see Chart A), which 
is quite revealing about the functioning of the IMS. Despite the fact that the global ﬁ  nancial 
crisis started in US ﬁ  nancial markets, investors initially ﬂ  ocked to the US dollar as a safe 
haven, and only began to express trust in alternatives as global ﬁ  nancial conditions normalised. 
The large private portfolio inﬂ  ows into the United States after September 2008 reﬂ  ected both the 
repatriation of funds by US residents to repay debts and a ﬂ  ight to safety in the global scramble 
for liquidity (McCauley and McGuire, 2009). As a result, from a near all-time low in early 2008, 
the real effective exchange rate of the dollar returned to its long-term average one year later, 
before subsequently falling back (Chart B).
Chart A Swings in the US dollar
(on the vertical scale: real effective exchange rate change over 
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Chart B Real effective exchange rate of the 
US dollar
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After September 2008, the US dollar appreciated against all major currencies except for the 
Japanese yen (Chart C.a), whereas six months after March 2009 it had depreciated bilaterally 
against nearly all major trading partners (Chart C.b).
Chart C Change in the US dollar versus selected currencies
(percentage changes)
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1.2.3 SAVINGS GLUT AND REAL IMBALANCES 
According to this strand of literature, in the 
years preceding the crisis the world economy 
experienced the emergence of a situation 
where the amount of income that economic 
agents planned to keep as savings exceeded 
planned investment at the global level. 
This view is expressed in various differing 
but complementary versions: the “savings 
glut” and “investment drought” hypotheses 
(Bernanke, 2005 and IMF, 2005, respectively; 
Rajan, 2010, also uses the expression 
“global supply glut”), the idea of “too 
much capital chasing too little investment” 
(see Trichet 2007), as well as the literature 
on strong global demand for, and deﬁ  cient 
supply of, liquid and tradable ﬁ  nancial assets 
(Caballero, 2006 and subsequent literature 
reviewed in Section 1.2.5). 
The interpretation is frequently used to explain 
why low real interest rates persisted even after 
the Federal Reserve System started raising 
policy rates in June 2004, thus engendering 
a fall in term spreads – a phenomenon that 
was labelled the “interest rate conundrum” 
(Greenspan, 2005 and 2007). Aside from the 
“conundrum”, the low-interest rate environment 
has also been attributed to accommodative 
monetary policies, which were one of the 
factors contributing to the “liquidity glut”, as 
discussed in the next section.
Low interest rates, coupled with limited 
volatility, created an environment that 
encouraged a global “search for yield” and 
the progressive build-up of systemic risk both 
via a widespread underestimation of risk and 
competitive compression of risk premia to 
abnormally low levels. This “under-pricing of the 
unit of risk” (Trichet 2009a, 2009b) contributed 
to the micro causes of the crisis. An elaboration 
of the transmission from the macro to the micro 
dimension falls outside the scope of this paper, 
but some contributions focusing on this issue 
are provided by Trichet (2009), Bini Smaghi 
(2008), Caballero (2009b), Rajan (2010), Taylor 
(2009), Portes (2009), “The Economist” (2009), 
and IMF (2009b).
In keeping with the view, the global glut 
of planned net savings was associated not 
only with exceptionally low risk premia on 
the price side, but also, on the quantity side, 
with the accumulation of saving/investment 
imbalances within several systemically relevant 
countries, and current account imbalances 
among  them,  which many analysts deemed 
to be unsustainable over the medium to long 
run (see e.g. Bracke, Bussière, Fidora and 
Straub, 2008). The most tangible manifestation 
of these imbalances was the “Lucas puzzle” 
of capital increasingly ﬂ   owing “uphill” from 
certain systemically relevant emerging market 
economies to certain ﬁ  nancially  developed 
economies (see Section 1.2.5 for a discussion). 
Warnock and Warnock (2007) show that this 
contributed signiﬁ  cantly to the compression of 
bond yields in the United States. 
From the policy perspective, two key systemic 
risks were identiﬁ  ed, namely an abrupt upward 
correction of historically low risk premia on the 
price side, and a disorderly unwinding of real 
imbalances on the quantity side. These risks 
were discussed repeatedly from the second half 
of 2003 onwards, at G7 and G20 summits and 
BIS and OECD-based meetings, as well as in 
the IMF-led multilateral consultation on global 
imbalances, which also identiﬁ  ed a list of policy 
actions to be undertaken to unwind the imbalances 
(IMF 2007a). Yet, policy courses in individual 
countries often persisted unchanged, or at any rate, 
policy changes implemented in the years preceding 
the crisis fell far short of those recommended in 
international fora (in both cases swayed by the 
system of incentives discussed in Section 1.1.2). 
Three cases illustrate. (See Catte, Cova, Pagano 
and Visco, 2010, for empirical evidence).
First, reserve accumulation continued unabated. 
After the Asian and Russian crises, several 
emerging market economies pursued export-led 
recoveries,6 in certain cases supported by 
persistently undervalued exchange rates held 
down by unilateral foreign exchange 
interventions. The ensuing reserve accumulation, 
See Rajan (2010) for an analysis of the underlying motives. 6 24
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unprecedented in size, was an important factor 
accompanying the emergence of large external 
surpluses in several emerging market economies, 
which were invested in mature ﬁ  nancial markets. 
Crucially, in light of the crisis, the extraordinary 
pace of reserve accumulation contributed to 
artiﬁ  cially lowering US yields.7 More generally, 
reserve accumulation beyond optimality 
thresholds created substantial distortions, costs 
and risks at the global, regional and domestic 
levels, which are summarised on Table 3.8 On 
the other hand, it should be also emphasised that 
in many emerging economies the build-up of 
foreign reserves was mainly driven by a desire 
to unilaterally self-insure against future crises – 
a desire exacerbated by a lack of trust in 
multilateral approaches to crisis prevention and 
resolution.
Notwithstanding this important self-insurance 
objective, on which we will come back in 
Section 2, the fact remains that by 2007 the level 
of reserves in many countries had risen well above 
optimality thresholds. Reserves exceeded all 
available measures of foreign reserve adequacy, 
not only the traditional benchmarks (three months 
of imports and the Greenspan-Guidotti rule) but 
also M2 or model-based benchmarks (Chart 5). 
The high and rising level of global reserves 
signalled a problem in the international 
monetary system and the increased risk of a 
disorderly unwinding. It pointed to a need for 
surplus countries to pursue greater exchange 
rate  ﬂ   exibility in effective terms, and to 
rebalance domestic demand on a permanent 
basis (Bini Smaghi 2010b). It also called for 
the international community to introduce more 
globally efﬁ   cient forms of foreign currency 
liquidity provision to cope with contagion from 
external shocks, thereby complementing, and over 
time replacing, national reserve accumulation for 
precautionary purposes (see Section 2).
Second, expansionary ﬁ  scal policies may have 
also played a role in fuelling the imbalances, 
at least in the United States, according to some 
observers. Kraay and Ventura (2005) note 
that the US current account deﬁ  cit, which had 
begun shrinking in the wake of the bursting of 
the dotcom bubble in 2001, started rising again 
A rich body of literature reviewed in Eurosystem (2006) provides  7 
detail.
See Bini Smaghi (2010b) for a review. 8 
Table 3 Medium-term distortions, costs and risks of reserve accumulation 
beyond optimality thresholds
Distortions, risks and costs
Global level Reserve accumulation corresponds to a large-scale re-allocation of capital ﬂ  ows organised by the public sector 
of the accumulating countries. This produces major distortions in the global economy and international ﬁ  nancial 
markets and can have negative implications for:
(i)  global liquidity conditions, by possibly contributing to an artiﬁ  cially low yield environment
(ii)   the  potential for build-up of asset price bubbles, to the extent that reserve accumulation is not sufﬁ  ciently sterilised
(iii)  global exchange rate conﬁ  gurations, including the risk of misalignments
(iv)   trade ﬂ  ows, to the extent that reserve accumulation becomes the equivalent of a protectionist policy subsidising 
exports and imposing a tariff on imports
Regional level  Reserve accumulation by a major economy in one region may contain currency appreciation in competitor countries 
in the same region when this is needed. This:
(i)  constrains the degree of ﬂ  exibility of the other currencies in the region,
(ii) may  magnify capital ﬂ  ow volatility in the other region’s economies in a context of misaligned exchange rates
Domestic level Reserve accumulation can:
(i)   undermine a stability-oriented monetary policy if the monetary policy of the anchor country is more 
expansionary than domestically required
(ii)   hamper the market-based transmission of monetary policy impulses and the development of the domestic 
ﬁ  nancial market
(iii) be  costly as reserves have a relatively lower return and involve sterilisation costs
(iv)   distort resource allocation, impede service sector development and constrain consumption and employment by 
unduly favouring the tradable sector at the detriment of the non-tradable sector
(v)   affect  income distribution and consumption growth by unduly damaging the household sector as a result 
of artiﬁ  cially low interest rates on deposits in a ﬁ  nancially underdeveloped economy25
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following the drastic switch to expansionary 
ﬁ   scal policy by the Bush administration – 
a move that was not associated with major 
Ricardian effects, and thus engendered the 
“twin deﬁ  cits”. 
Third, there were insufﬁ  cient structural reforms 
to address domestic and external imbalances. 
Focusing on emerging market economies, it 
should be highlighted that the materialisation of 
excess savings reinvested abroad by the ofﬁ  cial 
sector via reserve accumulation was not only a 
feature of the initial years following the Asian 
crisis, but has persisted in several emerging 
market economies also thereafter. Although 
the ability to save arose due to rapid rises in 
incomes, productivity and, in certain countries, 
commodity prices, the propensity to save and the 
allocation of savings were signiﬁ  cantly affected 
by structural factors, in particular:
(i)  the propensity of residents of some 
developing countries to accumulate 
precautionary savings in the absence of 
welfare provision; 
(ii)  a high adult-to-child ratio in China which 
forces higher saving by adults; 
(iii) domestic  ﬁ  nancial  underdevelopment 
(see Section 1.2.5); 
(iv) corporate governance issues in countries 
such as China, where the dividend policy 
to a large extent prevents the high proﬁ  ts 
of state-owned enterprises from becoming 
part of the investing households’ wealth.
Some of these structural factors could have 
been partially addressed by appropriate policies 
implemented over sufﬁ   ciently long time 
Chart 5 Foreign reserve adequacy ratios versus actual reserves in emerging market economies
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horizons, as Bracke, Bussière, Fidora and Straub 
(2008) discuss. For instance, greater provision 
of public goods in emerging market economies 
(such as social security) would have reduced the 
uncertainty which fuelled precautionary savings. 
POPULAR VERSUS SOPHISTICATED VERSIONS OF 
THE SAVINGS GLUT 
A “popular” version of the savings glut 
hypothesis has been frequently used in the 
policy debate, and rightly criticised in the 
literature. This version focuses only on the 
countries with large current account surpluses, 
and argues that these surpluses were a product 
of excess savings which, via net capital 
outﬂ   ows, directly depressed global long-term 
interest rates. This is a simpliﬁ  cation that cannot 
be fully reconciled with evidence. Rather, when 
the analysis is extended to gross capital ﬂ  ows, 
it becomes apparent that European banks played 
an even larger role in ﬁ  nancing the credit boom 
in the United States than the emerging market 
economies with a surplus. In other words, 
most of the gross portfolio inﬂ  ows fuelling the 
US housing bubble originated in the private 
sector rather than from reserve accumulation 
in the ofﬁ  cial sector (Borio and Disyatat, 2010; 
Whelan, 2010). This is an important (and often 
still overlooked) aspect. Indeed, in the years 
preceding the crisis there was no shared 
awareness in the international policy community 
that private foreign investors of several mature 
economies were allocating a substantial share 
of their assets in US mortgage-backed securities 
and similar structured assets. 
A more sophisticated, and harder to refute, 
version of the savings glut hypothesis rests on 
three important facets of excess savings:
First, the notion of excess savings refers to    •
total planned savings in excess of planned 
investment, not to actual savings which 
always have to equal investment at world 
level. While the ex-post sum of current 
account balances is by deﬁ   nition zero at 
the global level – hence the existence of 
surpluses in some countries does not by 
itself reveal anything about likely shifts in 
global planned savings over investment – 
the savings glut notion is ex ante in nature, 
and hence not really measurable. 
Second, the focus in the savings glut    •
hypothesis is on overall global excess 
savings. These savings encompass not only 
those originating from surplus economies but 
also those from any other sources, above all 
the multinational corporate sector as a result 
of cross-country balance sheet adjustments, 
for example as happened in the wake of the 
dot.com crisis. 
Third, the glut in    • net savings originated not 
only from gross savings (e.g. China), but 
also from a drought in gross investment. 
In particular, IMF (2005) emphasises the 
dramatic fall in investment that ensued 
in emerging East Asia other than China 
following the 1997-98 crisis. 
Borio and Disyatat (2010) provide another 
important critique of the savings glut literature, 
namely that explaining the low market interest 
rates entirely through the saving/investment 
framework is misleading in monetary economies 
such as the existing ones, where the market for 
ﬁ  nancing of deﬁ   cit expenditure plays a direct 
key role in determining interest rates. As a result, 
market interest rates do not necessarily match 
the  natural rate implied by the savings glut 
hypothesis. In the build-up of the ﬁ  nancial crisis, 
in particular, interest rates arguably fell below 
the natural rate. This implies that the low interest 
rate environment is not solely attributable 
to the savings glut, but also to factors such 
as accommodative monetary policies which 
contributed to the liquidity glut discussed in the 
next section.
1.2.4 THE LIQUIDITY GLUT, FINANCIAL 
IMBALANCES AND EXCESS ELASTICITY OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 
DURING THE “GREAT MODERATION”
The main argument put forward in this strand of 
the literature is that accommodative monetary 
policies in certain advanced countries – 
especially the United States and Japan – were 27
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a key driver of very low short-term interest 
rates and excess credit expansion in the years 
prior to the crisis. Alongside other factors, 
such accommodative policies did contribute 
to abundant liquidity and very low yields over 
the maturity spectrum. In particular, US policy 
rates in the 2000s were consistently below the 
levels predicted by the Taylor rule and by the 
levels expected based on historical experience 
(BIS, 2008; Taylor, 2007 and 2009; “The 
Economist”, 2007). Rather, low yields were 
the outcome of the interplay of speciﬁ  c policy 
decisions and broader explanatory factors, 
for instance: 
(i)  the sharp cut in policy rates undertaken to 
counter the 2001 recession and the effects 
of the events of 11 September 2001 (from 
6.5% in January 2001 to 1% in June 2003) 
were not followed by equivalent interest 
rate increases as the economy recovered, 
partly because of the increasingly jobless 
nature of US recoveries and the belief that 
tighter monetary policy could suppress a 
pick-up in employment;
(ii)  the (mistaken) expectation that the positive 
effect of the productivity shock emanating 
from the “new economy” in the 1990s 
would continue at a sustained pace in the 
2000s, which called for an accommodative 
stance even in the years when the shock 
was fading away;9
(iii) very low global inﬂ  ation associated with 
the “Great Moderation” discussed below; 
(iv) the belief that monetary policy has no 
role to play in curbing asset price rises 
(see e.g. Borio and Lowe (2002); Borio 
and Drehmann (2008 and 2009); Alessi 
and Detken (2008); and IMF (2009a). 
If, as Borio and Disyatat (2010) observe, “it is 
monetary policy that ultimately sets the price 
of leverage in a given currency area”, too loose 
monetary policies would have contributed 
to an excessive credit expansion and undue 
“elasticity of the current international monetary 
and  ﬁ   nancial system”. On the basis of this 
interpretation, a body of empirical literature 
has developed to explain the link between the 
liquidity glut, global imbalances and the low 
yield environment. For instance, Bracke and 
Fidora (2008) provide econometric evidence 
showing that accommodative monetary policies 
are responsible for a large part of the variation 
in both imbalances and ﬁ  nancial market prices. 
Barnett and Straub (2008) ﬁ  nd that, historically, 
monetary policy shocks (along with private 
absorption shocks) are the main drivers of 
current account deterioration in the United 
States. Bems, Dedola and Smets (2007) also 
show that a widening US current account deﬁ  cit 
partly reﬂ  ects US monetary policy shocks. 
According to a more comprehensive, thought-
provoking view (Borio 2009), the years of the 
Great Moderation preceding the crisis were 
characterised by three developments which were 
of considerable signiﬁ  cance for the environment 
within which ﬁ  nancial instability arose:
First, a number of positive    • supply shocks in 
the global real economy – above all, the entry 
of around 3 billion workers from emerging 
economies into the global workforce – 
raised global potential output growth while 
keeping inﬂ   ation down. Low inﬂ  ation  in 
turn justiﬁ   ed the very low interest rate 
environment, thereby indirectly encouraging 
credit and asset price booms.
Second, widespread    • ﬁ  nancial liberalisation 
means that the global economy was no 
longer held back by limited access to credit, 
but rather from having too few assets in 
which to invest. That is, the global economy 
shifted from being credit-constrained to 
being asset-constrained. Signiﬁ  cantly,  it 
However, in the literature there is some disagreement as to  9 
whether US monetary policy had really become too loose after 
2002, as the Taylor rule would suggest. Critics of the Taylor 
rule argue that: (i) it is not clear to what extent the Taylor rule is 
really “optimal” and can, therefore, be used to make a normative 
statement about how monetary policy should have reacted; 
(ii) the Federal Reserve System stance at that time was justiﬁ  ed 
by the need to insure against the risk of deﬂ  ation associated with 
the bursting of the dotcom bubble (see e.g. IMF (2009a)).28
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also meant that booms and busts in credit 
and asset prices were more likely, leading to 
economic ﬂ  uctuations. 
Third,    • the success of inﬂ  ation  targeting 
and, more generally, the anchoring of 
inﬂ  ation expectations meant that ﬁ  rst signs 
of an unsustainable economic expansion no 
longer became visible in higher inﬂ  ation 
(which would have led to monetary policy 
tightening) but rather in large and ultimately 
unsustainable increases in credit and other 
ﬁ   nancial imbalances (the “paradox of 
credibility”).
These changes in the “tectonic plates” (Borio 
2009) of the global economy and the ensuing 
“fault lines” (Rajan, 2010) made the world more 
vulnerable to the build-up of serious ﬁ  nancial 
imbalances,  such as overextensions in private 
sector balance sheets as a result of aggressive 
risk-taking. In actual fact, the interplay of the 
globalisation of the real economy, ﬁ  nancial 
liberalisation and the credibility of anti-inﬂ  ation 
regimes – three developments which were 
undoubtedly beneﬁ   cial per se – changed the 
functioning of the global economy in ways that 
were initially not well understood, and raised 
new, unexpected challenges that eventually 
undermined the ability of policy-makers to fully 
safeguard the beneﬁ  ts of the Great Moderation. 
Ultimately, the Great Moderation turned into a 
“Great Illusion”, as Borio (2009) provocatively 
observes. 
1.2.5 THE IMPLICATIONS OF UNEVEN FINANCIAL 
GLOBALISATION 
In Section 1.2.3 it was mentioned that ﬁ  nancial 
underdevelopment in most emerging market 
economies was a key structural feature causing 
local excess savings to be invested abroad by 
the ofﬁ  cial sector. This issue deserves further 
deepening, and is reviewed here with reference 
to both the analysis in the literature and the 
policy implications.
ANALYSIS IN THE LITERATURE
Under the mixed system, the income per capita 
of the group of countries with current account 
surpluses (which includes some rich countries 
such as Germany and Japan), i.e. recording 
net outﬂ   ows of capital, has been lower than 
that of the group with current account deﬁ  cits 
(see Chart 6). This observation runs contrary 
to conventional economic models, and poses 
somewhat of a puzzle.
According to standard theory, ﬁ  nancial 
integration between two groups of economies 
with different levels of economic development – 
which may be labelled “high income per capita 
countries” (HICs) and “low income per capita 
countries” (LICs) – is expected to lead to net 
capital  ﬂ   ows “downhill” from the HICs to 
the LICs, since the rate of return on capital 
and potential growth should be higher in the 
LICs. This expected outcome could be called a 
“ﬁ   rst-order effect” (Bini Smaghi, 2007), i.e. 
the initial consequence of ﬁ  nancial integration. 
Chart 6 Weighted average income per capita 
in the two groups of countries with current 
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y-axis: weighted average of per capita income 
surplus countries
deficit countries
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook.
Notes: The sample includes 83 countries. The vertical axis 
measures the weighted average of per capita income in the two 
groups of countries recording, respectively, current account 
surpluses and deﬁ   cits. To this end, the sample has been split 
into these two groups for each year of the period 1981-2008. 
For both groups, the share of each country in the group’s total 
current account balance has been calculated and then multiplied 
by the relative income per capita of the country concerned, in turn 
measured as a share, ranging between zero and one, of the income 
per capita of the richest country in the sample in each year. Data 
have been adjusted for different levels of purchasing power. 29
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However, recent experience with ﬁ  nancial 
integration under the mixed system has shown 
the opposite, as aggregated net capital ﬂ  ows 
travelled “uphill” to advanced economies from 
emerging market economies (notwithstanding 
some exceptions, such as emerging market 
economies in central and eastern Europe). An 
important qualiﬁ   cation is that in net terms, 
private capital has continued to ﬂ   ow to the 
LICs, as conventional models predict, but this 
has been outweighed by ofﬁ  cial capital directed 
by emerging market economies to advanced 
economies.10
Some recent contributions to the economic 
literature have argued that a second-order effect 
may be the main reason for the “uphill” ﬂ  ows 
(see Bini Smaghi, 2007). Underdeveloped 
ﬁ  nancial markets in emerging economies result 
in borrowing constraints 11 for their consumers 
and  ﬁ   rms. This impedes consumption 
smoothing over time as well as the ﬁ  nancing 
of several proﬁ  table investment opportunities, 
thereby holding back domestic demand. As a 
result, high-growth emerging economies with 
underdeveloped ﬁ  nancial markets are expected 
to produce, other things being equal, excess 
savings to be channelled abroad.
In line with this interpretation, several authors 
(e.g. Caballero, 2006, 2009a and b; Caballero, 
Farhi and Gourinchas 2008) claimed that fast-
growing emerging market economies have 
sought to store value in ﬁ  nancial assets that they 
do not produce, and, by doing so, they have 
contributed to a global shortage of supply of 
ﬁ   nancial assets. Indeed, while emerging 
economies have experienced a large increase in 
their disposable income, they have not been able 
to create ﬁ  nancial assets, i.e. to sell rights to 
future output, owing to their ﬁ  nancial 
underdevelopment. In this context, the fact that 
HICs have been supplying ﬁ   nancial assets to 
those emerging market economies that are 
unable to produce their own helps to explain 
HICs’ ﬁ  nancial account deﬁ  cits.12
Kroszner (2007) points out that the majority of 
emerging economies recorded current account 
deﬁ   cits until the mid-1990s despite having 
even less-developed local ﬁ  nancial systems at 
that time. Just as in the savings glut debate, the 
shift from current account deﬁ  cit to surplus in 
emerging market economies can only be fully 
understood by looking at the shocks to their 
output growth and total savings that occurred 
after the mid-1990s, in particular: (i) the Asian 
crisis, which resulted in a negative demand 
shock followed by greater reliance on export-
led growth; and (ii) two positive supply shocks 
in the 2000s – a productivity shock and rising 
commodity prices – to which the domestic 
demand of several emerging market economies 
did not fully adjust owing to the aforementioned 
structural factors that were feeding precautionary 
extra savings to be channelled abroad.
Differences in the degree of ﬁ  nancial 
development can also help explain the direction 
and nature of investment, i.e. why, as already 
mentioned, net private capital tends to ﬂ  ow to 
LICs, as one would expect, whereas the ofﬁ  cial 
sector accounts for most capital that is directed 
to HICs via the accumulation of foreign assets 
by central banks and sovereign wealth funds. 
According to Eurosystem (2006), whatever the 
origin of excess savings in emerging market 
economies, they tend to be channelled abroad 
by the ofﬁ  cial sector for three main reasons that 
are partly related to ﬁ  nancial underdevelopment: 
(i) the inefﬁ  ciency of the private sector of most 
emerging market economies in channelling 
The expression “private capital” refers here to the ﬁ  nancial  10 
account of the balance of payments net of “ofﬁ  cial capital”, in 
turn deﬁ  ned as changes in reserve assets plus any other capital 
ﬂ   ows triggered by the public sector (e.g. from/to sovereign 
wealth funds).
The term “borrowing constraints” should be understood as  11 
referring to a broad and complex set of ﬁ  nancial market features. 
In particular, low domestic ﬁ   nancial market liquidity tends 
to result in high domestic asset price volatility, thus creating 
incentives to invest abroad rather than domestically. Moreover, 
information asymmetries (due e.g. to lenders having insufﬁ  cient 
knowledge of borrowers) reduce the investment opportunities 
that can be ﬁ   nanced in a proﬁ   table way, thus forcing extra 
savings to be channelled abroad. Limits on consumer credit also 
contribute to containing domestic demand by limiting consumer 
spending.
While some of these authors have focused on a country’s ability  12 
to  supply assets, others have highlighted the link between 
ﬁ  nancial underdevelopment and savings, hence the demand for 
ﬁ  nancial assets (see Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2007) for 
the latter approach).30
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savings abroad; (ii) the presence, in some 
countries, of asymmetric capital controls 
discouraging portfolio capital outﬂ  ows;  and 
(iii) the desire to create “national buffers” 
against future ﬁ  nancial crises by accumulating 
foreign exchange reserves. 
In line with the literature summarised above, 
econometric analyses conducted by Chinn and 
Ito (2005 and 2008) as well as Dorrucci et al. 
(2009) also support the idea that ﬁ  nancial 
underdevelopment in emerging market 
economies has been an important structural 
factor contributing to the accumulation of global 
imbalances.
POSSIBLE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF CATCHING UP 
BY EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES IN FINANCIAL 
SECTOR DEVELOPMENT 
Dorrucci, Meyer-Cirkel and Santabárbara (2009) 
have developed a number of indices of domestic 
ﬁ   nancial development which show that the 
scope for “ﬁ  nancial catching up” in emerging 
market economies is still substantial. However, 
they also show that this process may have 
already started in certain countries. Charts 7 
and 8 illustrate some interesting results:
Chart 7 highlights that, the size of ﬁ  nancial    •
markets in emerging market economies taken 
as a whole shows some (limited) convergence 
towards that of advanced economies between 
2002 and 2006 (i.e. between the bursting of 
the dotcom bubble and the year before the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis). 
Chart 8 shows for selected emerging    •
ﬁ   nancial markets that (i) most grew in 
relative size between 1992 and 2006; and 
(ii) Korea, Saudi Arabia and India have been 
clearly converging, in recent years, towards 
a benchmark based on G7 economies 
excluding Canada (G6).
As Charts 7 and 8 conﬁ   rm, this process 
of  ﬁ   nancial convergence, at least in some 
emerging market economies, seems to have 
been signiﬁ  cantly inﬂ  uenced by ﬁ  nancial crises 
affecting either advanced or emerging market 
economies. Looking ahead, the size of emerging 
Chart 7 Index of financial market size: all 
emerging economies compared with benchmark 
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y-axis: financial size index
Sources: E. Dorrucci, A. Meyer-Cirkel and D. Santabárbara (2009).
Notes: The index of ﬁ   nancial market size is a sub-index of 
a broader index developed by the authors. EMEs stands for 
emerging market economies.
Chart 8 Index of financial market size: selected 
emerging economies compared with benchmark 


















y-axis: financial size index
Sources: E. Dorrucci, A. Meyer-Cirkel and D. Santabárbara (2009).
Note: The index of ﬁ  nancial market size is a sub-index of a 
broader index developed by the authors.31
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ﬁ  nancial markets may well rise relative to the 
size of advance economies after the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis. Owing to the crisis, the ﬁ  nancial sector 
in several mature economies, in particular in the 
United States, is de-leveraging and ultimately 
needs to shrink – a process which is already 
underway. In addition, especially since 2010 
(i.e., after the negative spillover effects of the 
crisis on emerging market economies have faded 
away) foreign and domestic investors have been 
looking with renewed interest into investing in 
emerging ﬁ  nancial markets. This has already led 
to a remarkable rise in capital ﬂ  ows to emerging 
market economies, which can be seen as a factor 
contributing to their ﬁ  nancial development.
In consequence, the distance between HICs and 
LICs in terms of domestic ﬁ  nancial development 
can be expected to narrow further in the years to 
come. As ﬁ  nancial sector development becomes 
more even globally, the ability of any ﬁ  nancially 
developed country to borrow extensively from 
the rest of the world, and thus accumulate 
massive levels of external debt ad inﬁ  nitum, 
will likely be reduced over time (as funding 
costs become punitive). With increasingly 
attractive alternatives made possible by the 
opening up of ﬁ  nancial accounts and ﬁ  nancial 
market development, mature economies will no 
longer be able to smooth consumption, share 
risk abroad and ﬁ   nance increasingly larger 
current account deﬁ  cits for any amount, under 
any circumstances and over any time horizon. 
In a world characterised by a greater degree 
of ﬁ  nancial symmetry, there would be far less 
likelihood of the accumulation of imbalances 
that occurred prior to the global ﬁ  nancial crisis.32
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2  AFTER THE CRISIS: HOW TO SUPPORT 
A MORE STABLE INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY SYSTEM
Several avenues are being debated, and some 
of them already pursued, in the process of 
international cooperation with a view to setting 
the right incentives for the creation of a more 
stable IMS (Table 4). 
Some avenues are aimed at enhancing 
the delivery of the ﬁ   rst IMS public good – 
the supply of international currency – through 
developments in, or even the creation of, 
currencies other than the US dollar as 
international currencies (discussed further 
in Section 2.1). These are complemented by 
initiatives to tackle the problems related to the 
accumulation of precautionary reserves by 
countries that are most exposed to capital ﬂ  ow 
volatility (discussed further in Section 2.2).
But the most important avenues are, in our view 
and for the reasons given in Section 1, those 
aimed at better delivering the second IMS public 
good – external stability – by improving 
the oversight of the system and its traction 
especially on the key issuers and holders of 
international currencies. The key challenge in 
this regard is to create incentives for individual 
countries to take full account of the collective 
beneﬁ  ts that would arise from the implementation 
of sounder and longer-term-oriented policies 
consistent with macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial 
stability (discussed further in Section 2.3). 
Whilst most of these avenues are to a large 
extent policy-driven, one should not overlook 
the crucial impact that more market-driven 
developments can have in shaping the IMS over 
the longer run (see Section 2.4).13 All these 
avenues are outlined in Table 4 and further 
discussed in the next sections.
2.1  ADDRESSING VULNERABILITIES RELATED 
TO THE SUPPLY OF INTERNATIONAL  
CURRENCIES 
2.1.1 TOWARDS A TRULY MULTIPOLAR CURRENCY 
SYSTEM?
One strand of the literature argues that the 
US dollar, while remaining the main 
international currency well into the future, may 
at some point become less dominant – i.e. “ﬁ  rst 
among equals” in the words of Eichengreen 
(2009) – for instance because the euro may gain 
further market share and the relative importance 
of the Chinese renminbi will very likely 
grow over time (see e.g. Bénassy-Quéré and 
Pisany-Ferry, 2011).
According to this literature, such a process would 
ultimately enhance the IMS to the extent that 
international investment would be spread more 
evenly, thereby mitigating distortions in interest 
Note that the focus is on possible measures by the ofﬁ  cial  13 
sector to bolster international monetary stability to avoid crises, 
especially those of a systemic nature. Hence, we do not focus on 
crisis resolution issues, which go beyond the scope of the paper.
Table 4 Possible avenues for a more stability-oriented international monetary system
Vulnerabilities in: Therapy Progress so far Potential
(1)   Supply of international 
currencies
* Currency competition = Multi-currency IMS
* Basket currency = SDR-based IMS







(2)   Precautionary demand 
for international currencies
* Global ﬁ  nancial safety net





(3) IMS oversight *   Focus on cross-country linkages (IMF, G20, regional)
* Current account indicative guidelines
* Dampen non-precautionary reserve demand
* Enhancing ﬁ  nancial surveillance











4) Market discipline * Financial development in EMEs
* Re-pricing of sovereign risk, etc.
+ +++33
ECB
Occasional Paper No 123
February 2011
2   AFTER THE CRISIS: 
HOW TO SUPPORT 
A MORE STABLE 
INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY SYSTEM
rates. It could also impose greater policy discipline 
on reserve issuers for two main reasons. First, the 
“exorbitant privilege” currently enjoyed by the 
United States would be distributed across more 
countries and currency areas, thereby becoming 
less important for individual reserve currency 
issuers (IRC 2010). The perceived “affordability” 
of global imbalances would diminish as 
a result. And second, this shift to a multipolar 
currency system process would by deﬁ  nition be 
associated with ﬁ  nancial globalisation becoming 
more even in nature, with the policy implications 
already discussed in Section 1.2.5.
However, the literature also stresses that there 
is a genuine risk that the transition to a truly 
multipolar currency system would engender 
prolonged phases of higher exchange rate and 
asset price volatility as the currency composition 
of e.g. foreign reserves, private sector portfolios 
and international payments adjusts. It is, 
therefore, argued that it would be very important 
that the shift towards a more multipolar currency 
system were (i) gradual, as has been the case 
with the changes observable since the advent of 
the euro (see Table 5); (ii) as smooth as possible; 
and (iii) driven by autonomous and independent 
decisions of private and ofﬁ  cial agents, rather 
than by forms of policy design that would 
likely bring about unintended consequences. 
Insightful proposals as to how the transition to 
a system with multiple international currencies 
could be smoothly managed are provided in 
Eichengreen (2011).
Looking ahead, while gradualism is indeed 
likely to persist (thanks to factors such as 
inertia and network externalities, which tend 
to support the incumbent currencies), the 
literature has identiﬁ  ed many variables that may 
play a crucial role in the possible shift towards 
a multipolar currency system. In the case 
of the euro, the two most important variables 
will probably be the mutual consistency of 
euro area policies in the aftermath of the 
2010-11 sovereign debt crisis – which should 
be embedded in a strengthened governance 
framework – and the ability of the euro area to 
reduce the fragmentation of its capital markets – 
which hampers their liquidity and, therefore, the 
attraction of the euro as an international currency. 
For the Chinese renminbi, key variables will be: 
(1) the shift to ﬁ  nancial account convertibility 
and a more ﬂ  exible exchange rate, (2) domestic 
ﬁ   nancial development, (3) continued sound 
economic policies that will generate further 
economic catching up, and (4) in the initial 
stages, government-led initiatives such as those 
recently undertaken to promote the settlement of 
China’s international trade in domestic currency. 
Finally, for the US dollar, policy credibility has 
been identiﬁ  ed as the most important variable 
for the future.
Several questions remain open, however. 
Is international liquidity a natural monopoly 
or not, i.e. is it efﬁ   cient to have more 
than one global currency, or would just 
one “hegemonic” currency be preferable 
(Eichengreen, 1987)? And does history 
suggest that the ongoing process may really 
lead to a truly multipolar currency system? 
Regarding the last question, Eichengreen 
and Flandreau (2009) remind us hat there are 
precedents in history, illustrating in particular 
that inertia and network externalities did 
not prevent the US dollar from overtaking 
the pound sterling in just one decade 
during the 1920s.
Table 5 The share of the euro 
in global markets 
(percentages; 1999-2009)
1999 2009
Stock of global foreign exchange reserves  1)
(countries reporting to the IMF) 18.1 27.3
Currency anchor, de facto
(trade-weighted) 9.0 12.0  2)
Stock of international debt securities  1)
(narrow measure)  3) 19.5 31.4
Stock of cross-border loans 1)
(narrow measure)  3) 11.8 20.3
Source: ECB.
1) At constant end-2009 exchange rates. 
2) 2008 data.
3) The narrow measure refers to issuance of international bonds 
and loans in foreign currency by non-residents of the country 
issuing the currency in which the issuance is denominated.34
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Finally, the question has been recently 
raised again of the role of gold in the IMS. 
(Zoellick, 2010) argues that the IMS “should 
also consider employing gold as an international 
reference point of market expectations about 
inﬂ  ation, deﬂ  ation and future currency values”. 
While this would not, of course, imply any sort 
of formal role for gold as a revived anchor for 
the IMS, Zoellick sees gold as an alternative 
store of value, especially if uncertainty about 
the future role of different currencies were to 
prevail during the period of transition towards a 
truly multipolar currency system. 
2.1.2 TOWARDS A GLOBAL CURRENCY SYSTEM 
WITH ELEMENTS OF SUPRANATIONALITY?
A different scenario from the organic 
development towards a multipolar currency 
system would, according to another strand 
in the literature, be that of steering the IMS 
towards a system based on “a currency 
disconnected from individual nations and able 
to remain stable in the long run” (Zhou 2009).
Such a system (which is the upshot of 
the “opposite view” discussed in Section 1.2.2) 
could be based on one of two different 
constructs: a currency basket or a supranational 
ﬁ  at currency. Both options raise many questions, 
which are brieﬂ  y summarised in this section.
CURRENCY BASKET: AN SDR-BASED 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM?
The ﬁ  rst option is to promote the use of the SDR 
(leaving it as a currency basket)  14 as a key 
reserve asset in the IMS. This proposal is not 
new and has triggered a rich debate over the past 
four decades. 
A review of main arguments for and against an 
enhanced role for the SDR is provided in, for 
example, IRC (2010), Carney (2010) and IMF 
(2011). In short, its proponents point out that, 
being a basket of major currencies, the SDR 
would (i) be a more stable store of value and unit 
of account than its constituent currencies 
individually, (ii) help the IMS to better cope with 
exchange rate volatility in a more multipolar 
currency world, (iii) reduce the likelihood 
for exchange rate adjustment for currencies 
pegged to it compared with pegs to national 
currencies; and (iv) enable the pricing decisions 
of risky assets to be based on “global” monetary 
conditions rather than on the monetary policy 
stance prevailing in an individual economy. 
For the SDR to develop a truly global role, 
its liquidity would need to be signiﬁ  cantly 
increased, i.e. not only through greater issuance 
by the IMF but also by developing a private 
SDR market. 
In addition, if a larger role for the SDR was 
pursued, countries could be encouraged – 
according to one proposal – to entrust part of 
their reserves to a fund denominated in SDR 
and managed by the IMF. Such a fund could 
facilitate off-market conversions of assets 
denominated in dollars or other international 
currencies into SDRs, an arrangement which 
echoes the proposal made back in the 1970s for 
an IMF substitution account (see for example, 
Zhou 2009, Williamson 2009, Cooper 2009, 
and Bergsten 2009). An IMF-managed fund 
for countries’ SDR reserves raises a number of 
questions, however:
Would it be sufﬁ  cient to trigger much more    •
than reserve diversiﬁ   cation, i.e. contribute 
to the SDR gradually becoming a well 
accepted international currency? Or in other 
words, can the SDR become a credible 
asset for reserve diversiﬁ  cation if a private 
SDR market does not develop at the same 
time? What would be needed for a private 
SDR market to develop, and what concrete 
steps could be undertaken to promote this 
end? Does the experience with the private 
European Currency Unit (ECU) market 
in the 1980s and early 1990s offer any 
lessons?
The SDR, or Special Drawing Right, is used by the ofﬁ  cial  14 
sector as a reserve asset, and in the IMF and some international 
organisations as a unit of account. The value of the SDR is based 
on a basket of four key currencies (US dollar, euro, yen and 
pound sterling). It is not a currency in the sense of a medium 
of exchange as there is no private market for buying or selling 
SDRs.35
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Would an SDR fund or substitution account    •
contribute to an orderly diversiﬁ  cation  of 
foreign reserves out of the US dollar, or is 
there a risk that the mere announcement of 
its creation would trigger a signiﬁ  cant loss 
of conﬁ  dence in the US dollar? And would 
the implementation of the proposal reduce 
the incentive for countries to build up 
reserves denominated in national currencies 
or, on the contrary, create moral hazard by 
encouraging reserve holders to engage in 
further accumulation?
Last but not least, who should bear the    •
potential exchange rate losses in such a 
substitution account? Several proposals have 
been made over time with regard to this 
last question, each one difﬁ   cult to accept 
for at least one of the parties involved – 
which leads to the core issue of the political 
feasibility of the account.
While the replies to these questions fall outside 
the scope of this paper, the authors see two 
general arguments against the pursuit of this 
option:  ﬁ   rst, the thorny complexities raised 
by the questions themselves; and second, the 
risk of unintended consequences of replacing 
international currencies that have established 
themselves as a result of the autonomous 
decisions of private and ofﬁ  cial  agents 
with a synthetic, policy-imposed, international 
currency. One of these unintended consequences 
could be the one alluded to above – that reserve 
holders may regard a substitution account as a 
way to continue accumulating foreign exchange 
reserves while divesting themselves of currency 
risk. This is an example of how such an 
initiative could create moral hazard behaviour 
in certain countries, and impair rather than 
strengthen the stability of the IMS. Moreover, 
there are concerns that, if the issuance rule 
is vague, there could be large increases in 
the stock of SDRs which could have serious 
implications for the conduct of monetary policy 
and the sovereignty of central banks issuing 
the international currencies included in the 
SDR basket. Finally, should the SDR become 
a widely used medium of exchange, a strong 
increase in the supply of SDRs might directly 
produce global inﬂ  ationary pressures.
SUPRANATIONAL FIAT CURRENCY: 
A BANCOR-BASED INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY SYSTEM?
The second option seeks to overcome the limits 
of the currency basket by making a more 
radical proposal: a new supranational currency, 
issued by a supranational central bank, ﬂ  oating 
against national currencies. This would serve as 
“outside ﬁ  at money” and in so far resemble the 
well-known bancor proposed by John Maynard 
Keynes as leader of the UK delegation during 
the Bretton Woods negotiations (Keynes 1944).
Of the many questions surrounding this 
proposal, those regarding its feasibility stand out 
most. Would countries be willing to give up part 
of their monetary sovereignty to a supranational 
central bank at the global level? Would 
the incentive to surrender sovereignty differ 
for large and  small countries? What would be 
a realistic time horizon for the introduction of 
such a challenging proposal? What intermediate 
steps would need to be taken, and what further 
measures would be needed in the longer term? 
Setting aside these feasibility concerns, the 
question remains as to whether such a currency 
could solve the Trifﬁ  n dilemma once and for all, 
or whether it would simply lead to a novel 
version of the dilemma. According to Landau 
(2009), the supranational currency would need 
to be kept strong so that it did not depreciate 
against other major existing currencies – which 
would imply restricting its supply. Failing that, it 
may depreciate, which would undermine its 
attractiveness, and hence function, as a reserve 
asset. At the same time, if its supply were 
restricted, the supranational currency would 
likely be unable to accommodate the demand 
for reserves and so fall short in its function.15 
This is not to deny the importance and actuality of Keynes’s  15 
proposal, for instance in that it aims to institutionalise 
the need for adjustment on the part of both surplus and deﬁ  cit 
countries. It could indeed be argued that the main value added 
of the proposal is that it “imposes” symmetry on an IMS 
which otherwise would probably not be capable of delivering 
it (see Kregel (2010) for a recent discussion).36
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2.2  ADDRESSING VULNERABILITIES AFFECTING 
THE PRECAUTIONARY DEMAND 
FOR INTERNATIONAL CURRENCIES
2.2.1 MEASURES TO ADDRESS EXTERNAL 
SHOCKS RESULTING IN THE DRYING UP 
OF INTERNATIONAL LIQUIDITY 
AND SUDDEN STOPS IN CAPITAL INFLOWS
The liberalisation of capital ﬂ  ows and increasing 
global ﬁ  nancial integration have brought several 
beneﬁ  ts (see Section 2.2.2), but an undesired 
effect has been greater volatility in capital 
ﬂ  ows, especially to and from emerging market 
economies (CGFS 2009). During ﬁ  nancial crises, 
there are typically sudden withdrawals of liquidity 
denominated in foreign currency, even from 
countries other than where the crisis originated. 
As a result, over the past few years – but 
particularly after the Lehman shock of 
September 2008 – new global mechanisms for 
the short-term provision of liquidity to sovereign 
states and their central banks developed alongside 
national buffers such as foreign exchange 
reserves. By and large, the primary objective of 
these mechanisms is to offer liquidity support 
under exceptional circumstances to eligible 
countries in order to cushion contagion effects 
from external shocks. At the peak of the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, in late 2008 and 2009, they included: 
(i)    multilateral facilities, i.e. the IMF’s 
Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and high-access 
precautionary arrangements 16; 
(ii)  regional facilities, e.g. the EU’s medium-
term  ﬁ   nancial assistance facility 
(MTFA) and the Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralisation (CMIM) 17; 
(iii) bilateral facilities, i.e. bilateral currency 
swaps or repurchase agreements (repos) 
with major central banks (such as the 
Federal Reserve System, the European 
Central Bank, the Bank of Japan and the 
People’s Bank of China), (Chart 9).
To draw lessons from the experience with 
these facilities (see Obstfeld et al. 2009), 
the international community conducted an 
assessment in 2010 of whether this framework – 
which has been labelled the global “ﬁ  nancial 
safety net” (FSN) – was effective and efﬁ  cient 
in countering liquidity strains and sudden stops 
for countries with fundamentally sound and 
solvent  ﬁ   nancial systems that were affected 
by contagion. The IMF and the G20 discussed 
options for strengthening the FSN, and in 2010 
the following steps were agreed:
First, the IMF Executive Board approved    •
(i) the enhancement of the FCL, primarily 
lengthening the duration and removing 
the access limit; and (ii) a new instrument, 
In addition, as part of the response to the ﬁ  nancial crisis launched  16 
by the G20, the IMF membership decided in August 2009 on a 
general allocation of SDRs equivalent to about USD 250 billion. 
It was accompanied by the entry into force of the special SDR 
allocation which had been pending since 1997. The general 
allocation was intended to provide liquidity to the global 
ﬁ  nancial system by supplementing the IMF member countries’ 
foreign exchange reserves, thereby helping to meet the long-term 
need for global reserves.
In Europe, regional support facilities underwent further  17 
development in 2010 as a result of the euro area debt crisis and 
its ramiﬁ  cations. However, a discussion of this development falls 
outside the scope of this paper.
Chart 9 Main bilateral currency swaps 
and repos among central banks during 
the financial crisis
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Note: The People’s Bank of China has in turn established 
bilateral swaps for the countervalue of RMB 800 billion (about 
USD 100 billion) with Korea, Hong Kong SAR, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Iceland and Argentina.37
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the Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) for 
Fund members that have sound policies but 
do not meet the FCL’s high qualiﬁ  cation 
requirements.  
Second, G20 leaders encouraged the IMF    •
to continue its work to improve the global 
capacity to cope with systemic shocks. 
This work is set to involve designing 
procedures for the synchronised approval 
of FCLs for multiple countries, allowing a 
number of countries affected by a common 
shock to concurrently access the facility. 
G20 Leaders also encouraged the dialogue 
between the IMF and regional ﬁ  nancing 
arrangements in view of potential synergies 
from collaboration. They also asked the G20 
ﬁ  nance ministers and central bank governors 
to further explore, in 2011, the feasibility of 
a structured approach to coping with shocks 
of a systemic nature.
Regarding the features of a possible structured 
approach to the FSN, one promising avenue in 
the view of the authors might be to hold a 
discussion within the central bank community, 
under the aegis of the BIS, into the role of 
central banks in the FSN. Such a discussion 
could explore the advantages and disadvantages 
of enhancing the central bank component, with 
the aim of agreeing on possible ways forward in 
the event of a crisis. For example, discussions 
could focus on the design of best practices for 
central bank currency swap lines in order to 
facilitate their partial standardisation 18. While 
such work would in no way commit central 
banks  ex ante to providing such lines 
(pre-commitment would risk a conﬂ  ict  with 
central banks’ own objectives and mandates), it 
could nevertheless introduce some useful 
standards. 
In addition, some have suggested that the IMF 
and G20 conduct a thorough discussion into 
the pros and cons of developing a truly global 
approach to channelling liquidity to systemically 
important countries facing contagion from 
external shocks. Coordinating resources at a 
global level in order to deal with systemic events 
more efﬁ  ciently holds, of course, great appeal, 
although the operational feasibility may pose a 
major challenge. In particular, the recent proposal 
by IMF staff to develop an IMF-led “Global 
Stabilisation Mechanism” (GSM) has run into a 
number of serious objections. In order to have 
further, fruitful discussions on this proposal, it 
would be helpful if the IMF and G20 shared a 
consensus on some basic premises, in particular, 
the following three:
First, any GSM-type approach should only    •
be adopted to help out countries with very 
sound fundamentals suffering from ﬁ  nancial 
market disruptions (such as foreign currency 
liquidity shortages or sudden stops in 
capital inﬂ  ows) caused by contagion from 
exceptional (e.g. Lehman-type) external 
shocks. Conversely, idiosyncratic shocks to 
countries resulting mainly from their own 
policy failures should not be covered by 
the GSM. This calls for a proper analysis 
and identiﬁ  cation of the origins of ﬁ  nancial 
market disruptions, without which serious 
moral hazard problems would arise.  
Second, any mechanism to channel    •
cross-border liquidity at the global level 
will not work without the direct or indirect 
co-operation of central banks. This is because 
only central banks have the ability to provide 
unlimited liquidity – a unique function that 
cannot be circumvented or substituted for by 
other parties. 
Third, central banks cannot, and should    •
not, commit ex ante to the provision of 
international liquidity in a crisis (e.g. by 
pre-announcing criteria for bilateral swap/
repo arrangements in case of systemic events). 
The “constructive ambiguity” approach 
followed thus far by liquidity-providing 
central banks is indeed necessary to preserve 
their monetary policy autonomy, protect 
the soundness of their balance sheets, and 
Full ex ante standardisation would be neither advisable nor  18 
feasible because central banks in various countries face different 
legal constraints.38
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respect the mandate, resources, expertise and, 
ultimately, nature of these institutions. An 
excessively proactive approach by the major 
central banks would, again, fuel moral hazard 
behaviour at the global level.
2.2.2 CREATING DISINCENTIVES TO NATIONAL 
RESERVE ACCUMULATION FOR 
PRECAUTIONARY PURPOSES
THE LINK BETWEEN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
SAFETY NET AND RESERVE ACCUMULATION
While the core objective of the FSN is to address 
contagion, an open policy issue is whether and 
to what extent an enhanced FSN could become 
an acceptable substitute for unilateral reserve 
build-up, in consideration of the fact that reserve 
accumulation beyond optimality thresholds 
creates substantial distortions, costs and risks at 
the global, regional and domestic levels, as has 
been summarised on Table 3.
As discussed in Section 1.2.3, there are 
two core drivers of reserve accumulation: 
precautionary purposes but also non-
precautionary incentives (e.g. as a by-product 
of maintaining an undervalued exchange rate). 
The FSN liquidity instruments are not relevant 
for addressing the non-precautionary build-up 
of reserves. But they may, at least partly, replace 
the demand for foreign exchange reserves for 
precautionary purposes.  Certainly, an enhanced 
FSN would be more globally efﬁ  cient than the 
unilateral accumulation of foreign reserves in 
providing countries with an insurance against 
contagion.19 But would it be also effective, i.e. 
prove sufﬁ  ciently attractive to induce countries 
to signiﬁ   cantly reduce their precautionary 
reserve accumulation? 
In our view, it is doubtful that the FSN could 
successfully discourage precautionary foreign 
reserve accumulation in the short to medium 
run. At least in the initial phase, no matter how 
ﬂ  exible or well-tailored the FSN facilities can 
be made, the stigma associated with obtaining 
ﬁ  nancial assistance from an external party may 
rule out reliance on global facilities. However, if 
the experience with, and credibility of, the FSN 
were to grow, reserve accumulators may in time 
reconsider their options. Greater involvement by 
these countries in IMF governance, and hence 
programme oversight, would likely play an 
important role in this regard. At the same time, 
it remains important to ensure that any facilities 
adopted should not be undesirable from other 
viewpoints, such as moral hazard, as discussed 
above.
In conclusion, a carefully crafted FSN could 
help fulﬁ  l countries’ precautionary demand for 
reserves over time, thereby reducing unilateral 
reserve accumulation. But it cannot be the 
only instrument. Other multilateral approaches 
are needed to address both precautionary 
(see next sub-section) and non-precautionary 
(see Section 2.3.1, pp. 48-50) reserve 
accumulation. 
ADDRESSING CAPITAL FLOW VOLATILITY 
The main reason why countries seek 
precautionary reserves is to be able to deal 
with capital ﬂ  ow volatility, especially sudden 
withdrawals. There are, however, other ways 
to help prevent capital ﬂ   ow volatility from 
disrupting economic and ﬁ  nancial activity, and 
the IMF is well-placed to help.
In seeking methods to address capital ﬂ  ow 
volatility, it is important to preserve the 
beneﬁ  ts,20 while minimising the risks associated 
with capital ﬂ  ows. Although risks often relate to 
capital outﬂ  ows, they are also implicit in capital 
inﬂ  ows, since surges in inﬂ  ows can set the stage 
for disruptive reversals and unsustainable 
bubbles.
Mateos y Lago, Duttagupta and Goyal (2009) describe unilateral  19 
reserve accumulation as “a costly, globally inefﬁ  cient way of 
meeting the need” for insurance against future crises.
To name just some of the beneﬁ  ts, experience has shown that  20 
capital ﬂ  ows, especially to emerging market economies, can be 
advantageous for a number of reasons: they allow the ﬁ  nancing 
of productive investment projects in countries with limited 
private savings; they propel the deepening and reform of ﬁ  nancial 
markets in ﬁ  nancially underdeveloped countries; and they further 
the diversiﬁ  cation of investment risk and intertemporal ﬁ  nancial 
trades in recipient economies (Ostry et al. 2010).39
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When examining sources of risk, two sets in 
particular stand out which are especially relevant 
for countries with pegged exchange rates and/or 
underdeveloped ﬁ  nancial markets:
(i)  risks stemming from external factors, such 
as portfolio ﬂ  ow volatility as a result of the 
search for yield, swings in risk aversion, 
or contagion. While such risks may affect 
both inﬂ   ows to and outﬂ   ows from an 
emerging economy, the focus is often on 
the problems caused by sudden outﬂ  ows 
as international investors withdraw funds. 
It should be noted that it is usually not 
the magnitude of the ﬂ  ows that causes the 
problem (except in speciﬁ  c country cases), 
but rather their volatility. For example, at 
the time of writing, a number of economies 
are increasingly exposed to volatility-
related risks such as exchange rate over- 
and undershooting, asset mis-pricing and 
sudden reversals in capital ﬂ  ows; 
(ii) risks stemming from domestic factors, 
and related to possible asset price and 
credit boom-busts over the medium 
run. Speciﬁ   cally, structural factors (e.g. 
underdevelopment of ﬁ  nancial  markets) 
and/or policy failures (e.g. creating strong 
expectations for exchange rate appreciation 
by resisting it for too long) may fuel 
ﬁ   nancial stability risks associated with 
capital inﬂ   ows (even in the absence of 
external shocks). In particular, strong net 
inﬂ  ows, especially in portfolio capital, may 
under certain conditions inﬂ   ate asset or 
property prices and fuel credit growth. This 
increases the risk of boom/bust cycles over 
the medium run. 
In view of these risks, several emerging market 
economies may be tempted to step up both 
precautionary reserve accumulation and capital 
controls.  (At the time of writing, such behaviour 
was in evidence.) However, such actions 
may be neither necessary nor appropriate. In 
deciding how to cope with a surge in capital 
inﬂ  ows, for example, countries would be 
well-advised to conduct a policy check focusing 
on both macroeconomic and macro-prudential 
considerations (see e.g. Ostry et al. 2010). From 
the macroeconomic perspective, four policy 
checks are appropriate that are best conducted 
successively: First, is there a case for exchange 
rate appreciation? Second, is there a case for 
further precautionary reserve accumulation and, 
if yes, is there a case for increased sterilisation 
of the monetary impact of inﬂ   ows? Third, is 
there a case for monetary policy easing? And 
fourth, is there a case for ﬁ  scal  tightening? 
From the macro-prudential perspective, a ﬁ  fth, 
complementary policy check could explore 
whether prudential regulations are appropriate or 
need adjusting to prevent excessive borrowing 
from abroad and/or a domestic credit boom.
Only where these policy measures are found 
to be inappropriate for the country concerned 
or have been tried and proven inadequate, 
it might be useful for a country to consider 
the implementation of carefully-designed 
and temporary capital controls. It should be 
remembered that both evidence and historical 
experience suggest that the effectiveness of 
such controls is, at best, mixed. In particular, 
effectiveness tends to diminish the more the 
country has liberalised its ﬁ  nancial  account. 
If controls succeed in temporarily calming 
ﬂ  ows, it is important that this period be used 
to enact structural policy changes to better 
address the pressures (e.g. new supervisory 
or regulatory measures). Last but not least, it 
should be noted that widespread, unnecessary 
and poorly implemented capital controls would 
have negative global externalities, e.g. in terms 
of exchange rate misalignments, exacerbating 
global imbalances, setbacks in ﬁ  nancial 
integration, and, ultimately, signiﬁ  cant losses in 
global output and welfare. 
These negative externalities explain why 
international institutions and fora such as the 
IMF and the G20 should help countries address 
the issue of excessive capital ﬂ  ow  volatility. 
Regarding the IMF, its ability to assist in this 
area has thus far been constrained (i) in how 
deeply it can cover capital ﬂ   ow issues on 
account of its mandate and (ii) by the lack of 40
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any jurisdiction over the ﬁ  nancial  account.   
However, as a result of the crisis, the IMF has 
been mandated to strengthen its role regarding 
international capital ﬂ   ows. Looking forward, 
there are various areas in which the IMF and 
G20 could make progress (some of which are 
already in train 21):
(i)  help emerging market economies better 
monitor capital ﬂ  ows (IMF); 
(ii)  develop a code of good conduct for the 
possible implementation of temporary 
capital control measures (G20), and advise 
on the design of such controls (IMF); 
(iii)  encourage countries to maintain a medium-
run perspective by advising them about the 
negative consequences of capital controls 
if such controls become semi-permanent 
or permanent in nature (IMF);
(iv) offer policy advice on alternatives to 
capital controls – for example, on the 
beneﬁ   ts of moving to greater exchange 
rate  ﬂ   exibility coupled with enhanced 
autonomy in setting monetary policy rates 
and macro-prudential measures (IMF);
(v)  continue to evaluate the effectiveness 
of capital controls and keep members 
informed of results (both G20 and IMF). 
Importantly, members considering 
restrictions should be reminded of the 
aforementioned inconclusive empirical 
evidence on the efﬁ  cacy of capital ﬂ  ow 
controls;
(vi)  usefully build on the IMF Annual Report 
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (which is currently conﬁ  ned 
to reporting purposes) by including in such 
a publication an assessment of practices 
and trends;
(vii)  improve IMF surveillance over the ﬁ  nancial 
sector, and advise on how to improve 
ﬁ  nancial sector prudential regulation and 
supervision (e.g. by suggesting proper 
measures to mitigate exposures in foreign 
currency);
(viii) develop an IMF view on capital ﬂ  ows to 
help establish guidelines for surveillance 
of capital accounts and possibly other 
policies affecting capital ﬂ  ows;
(ix) analyse and disseminate lessons from 
country experiences in dealing with capital 
ﬂ   ows, and draw attention to potential 
spillovers from the various approaches;
(x)  foster a dialogue and policy coordination 
on cross-border capital ﬂ  ows  both 
multilaterally, and between originators and 
recipients of cross-border capital ﬂ  ows.
2.3  IMPROVING THE OVERSIGHT 
OF THE SYSTEM: RISK IDENTIFICATION 
AND TRACTION
To prevent the ﬂ   exibility and adaptability of 
the current IMS – which are its strengths – 
from becoming its weakness, it is imperative 
to oversee the system so as to ensure it remains 
on a steady course and does not lead to the 
accumulation and disorderly unwinding of real 
and  ﬁ   nancial imbalances. Oversight involves 
surveillance and mutual policy assessment in 
order to identify risks in good time and induce 
corrective policy action. Since the crisis, efforts 
have been under way to improve oversight on 
both counts. This section explores these efforts.
2.3.1 IMPROVING OVERSIGHT: TOWARDS BETTER 
RISK IDENTIFICATION
The crisis exposed shortcomings in the oversight 
conducted by institutions at the international, 
regional and domestic level. The IMF, for its 
part, identiﬁ   ed the following weaknesses in 
its own surveillance: warnings had been too 
vague, scattered, unspeciﬁ  c, and tardy. The IMF 
admitted that “its surveillance signiﬁ  cantly 
underestimated the combined risk across sectors, 
See, for example, the IMF Public Information Notice  21 
(5 January 2011) on “IMF Discusses the Fund’s Role Regarding 
Cross-border Capital Flows”.41
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and the importance of ﬁ  nancial sector feedback 
and spillovers” (IMF 2009c). It was not alone 
in having these shortcomings. Its ﬁ  ndings have 
determined the direction of efforts to improve 
oversight by all relevant authorities, including 
itself, the G20 and the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB), as well as regional bodies. 
The focus is now primarily on improving the 
understanding of multilateral linkages among 
economies, or “joining the dots” in the process of 
oversight. By going beyond the surveillance of 
individual economies, the aim is to examine the 
implications of spillover effects, synergies and 
feedback loops across countries – in one word, 
their interaction – for economic, monetary and 
ﬁ  nancial system stability. The reciprocal nature 
of the mutual assessment of policies by country 
and area authorities should facilitate multilateral 
and regional surveillance. In the words of Rajan 
(2010), “countries have to understand that there 
are important collective beneﬁ  ts from adopting 
sounder policies, and that if they want a platform 
from which to inﬂ  uence the policies of others, 
they have to allow others a platform to inﬂ  uence 
theirs”.
Turning to the speciﬁ  c contents of oversight, 
we are of the view that embedding external 
stability  more clearly and explicitly in the 
process of risk identiﬁ   cation would be a 
key improvement. In this context, a number 
of initiatives designed to dampen the non-
precautionary demand for foreign exchange 
reserves would be important. Finally, renewed 
emphasis is rightly being given to ﬁ  nancial 
sector imbalances and macro-prudential issues. 
THE G20 MUTUAL ASSESSMENT PROCESS
The greater impact of the crisis on advanced 
countries relative to the rest of the world 
undermined the authority that the G7 had hitherto 
enjoyed in global economic affairs. Instead 
the G20, in existence since the Asian crisis, 
quickly assumed the mantle of global economic 
coordinating group. Its Mutual Assessment 
Process (MAP) has the potential to introduce the 
biggest improvement in multilateral oversight in 
the wake of the crisis. The aim is to assess and 
improve the mutual compatibility of national 
policy programmes in an effort to improve the 
outlook for global economic growth. In essence, 
the world’s 20 most important economies 
present their own and review each others’ policy 
programmes, using common assumptions, 
to identify the global effect of their combined 
plans. Building upon the “base case scenario” 
(i.e. the prospects for global growth based on 
current policy plans), they explore the scope 
to improve the global outcome by deﬁ  ning the 
necessary policy measures, and undertaking 
to make policy adjustments where feasible. 
The G20 MAP represents a new approach to 
global surveillance, in that leaders formulate 
a shared objective and engage in a dynamic 
process of data analysis and policy adjustment 
to achieve that objective. 
The MAP is the centrepiece of the Framework 
for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth 
launched by G20 leaders at the Pittsburgh 
summit in September 2009. The name of the 
framework reﬂ  ects the G20’s concern to address 
the key challenge exposed by the crisis – how 
to improve the sustainability of global economic 
growth at a sound rate, which requires growth 
to be balanced across economies. The MAP 
is underpinned by a set of Core Values for 
Sustainable Economic Activity agreed by 
G20 leaders, under which members commit to 
conducting sound macroeconomic policies that 
help avoid unsustainable imbalances and to 
ensuring that markets function on the basis of 
propriety, integrity and transparency. 
The exercise has several stages per cycle, and 
is to be repeated annually. In the ﬁ  rst stage, 
ministers and governors agree on shared policy 
objectives suited to the evolving global 
economic and ﬁ   nancial conditions. In the 
second stage, each G20 member submits its 
national (regional in case of the EU/euro area, 
which is a G20 member) medium-term policy 
framework, encompassing ﬁ  scal,  monetary, 
exchange rate, trade and structural policies. 
The IMF evaluates the collective implications 
of these policy frameworks and assesses their 
consistency with the agreed objectives, drawing 42
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as necessary on expertise from other relevant 
international institutions.22 It produces a 
forward-looking report on the base case 
scenario for assessment by the G20. In addition, 
at the request of the G20, the report includes 
both an upside scenario (examining how the 
base case/global growth could be improved 
upon and the policy actions necessary) as well 
as a downside scenario (should the risks 
identiﬁ   ed materialise). For the next stage, 
members review their policy programmes in 
light of the policy actions identiﬁ  ed to achieve 
the upside scenario, and communicate possible 
changes to the group. In the ﬁ  nal stage, G20 
Leaders identiﬁ  ed and agreed on the actions 
needed to achieve the shared objectives, and 
endorsed policy recommendations applicable 
to groups of countries facing similar 
circumstances. The onus then shifts to the 
member countries to act on the mutually agreed 
recommendations. Progress is monitored at the 
summit meetings). The ﬁ  rst cycle took place 
in 2010. At the Seoul summit in November 
2010, G20 leaders conﬁ  rmed their commitment 
to the process and agreed to expand and reﬁ  ne 
the MAP by incorporating indicative guidelines 
against which to assess imbalances.
The process is still insufﬁ  ciently  advanced 
to determine whether it represents a major 
contribution to more effective oversight, yet the 
effort has the potential to lift global economic 
governance to a new level. By introducing 
a goal for sustainable global growth and an 
iterative procedure of analysis and policy 
adjustment, it improves on the best effort in 
global economic surveillance to date, which is 
the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO). 
As an initiative of G20 leaders themselves, 
broad in scope, embracing the largest economies 
and with high visibility, it represents a concerted 
effort to improve global economic performance. 
Being a new process, it will evolve over time 
as experience grows. The real test will be the 
extent to which it is supported by consistent 
policy actions at the country level. It should be 
acknowledged that the MAP remains a purely 
intergovernmental process and is not binding on 
the countries involved. 
THE MULTILATERAL SURVEILLANCE OF THE IMF
Even before the crisis, the IMF was cognisant of 
the weaknesses in its multilateral surveillance, 
but the crisis threw them into sharper relief. 
As a result, various proposals have been put 
forward to improve practices and processes. 
Each of them is helpful, even if the impact of 
any one of them will inevitably be somewhat 
limited. Arguably the biggest contribution these 
proposals will make, if they come into being, 
will be to raise awareness that, in today’s global 
economy, the Fund’s duty to oversee the IMS 
is its most important surveillance function. 
This stands in contrast to the long-standing 
emphasis on bilateral surveillance. A conceptual 
shift is needed such that bilateral surveillance 
is seen as a means to promoting the overriding 
concern with the IMS, not as an end in itself. 
This shifting of bilateral surveillance to the 
second order has yet to receive wide recognition, 
partly owing to past IMF practices. At the time 
of the IMF’s establishment, the emphasis on 
bilateral surveillance made sense. The global 
economy and ﬁ   nancial markets were 
fragmented, ﬁ  nancial accounts were regulated, 
trade was restricted, exchange rates were ﬁ  xed 
and  ﬁ   nancial sectors were heavily regulated. 
As global integration increased in the 1980s 
and 1990s, the view took hold that global 
stability would be assured if each member 
“kept its own house in order” (the OHIO view), 
which perpetuated the emphasis on bilateral 
surveillance. This focus was also reinforced 
by the fact that membership of the IMF was 
country-based, and the country perspective 
persisted despite the advent of economic and 
monetary unions when policy authority was 
no longer conﬁ   ned to the national level for 
some major economies. For too long, Fund 
surveillance remained captured by members 
demanding equal, but not too rigorous, 
treatment, which absorbs a vast amount of the 
Fund’s human resources and effort, in a measure 
disproportionate to its importance to global 
economic stability. Post-crisis, this approach 
Simultaneously, the World Bank advises on how to promote  22 
development and reduce poverty in the process.43
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is no longer sufﬁ  cient. The Fund has always 
had a clear and unique mandate to “oversee 
the international monetary system in order to 
ensure its effective operation” (Article IV, 3a of 
the IMF’s Articles of Agreement). Now, more 
than ever, it needs member support to develop 
the procedural and analytical tools to do so 
effectively. Its responsibility for delivering the 
global public good of international monetary 
stability – or external stability, as deﬁ  ned in this 
paper – deserves the support of its members. 
To this end, there is debate about a possible 
Multilateral Surveillance Decision (MSD). The 
aim of an MSD would be to provide guidance 
on the role of staff and the expectations of 
members regarding the scope and modalities of 
multilateral surveillance, akin to the Decision on 
Bilateral Surveillance Over Members’ Policies 
agreed in 2007. An MSD need not result in a 
raft of new initiatives adding to the surveillance 
burden on members. Its proponents are of the 
view that it would be useful in two ways: ﬁ  rst, 
in gathering together the various approaches 
to multilateral surveillance under a common 
umbrella, reﬂ   ecting on their synergies and 
prompting reﬂ   ection on identifying and ﬁ  lling 
gaps to optimise coverage and analysis; second 
and more importantly, in shifting the emphasis in 
surveillance towards ensuring the stability of the 
IMS as a global public good. The role, and hence 
resources, accorded to bilateral surveillance 
could be better allocated once set in this context. 
Experience of the difﬁ  culty reaching the bilateral 
surveillance decision has reduced the appetite 
of some for attempts to agree on an MSD. 
However, such a decision could well be easier 
to achieve because the emphasis is more on 
exposing interlinkages and less on the policies 
of individual members. While the Fund is under 
a duty to undertake multilateral surveillance 
(even though it has discretion on how to do so), 
members are only obliged to consult with the 
Fund in the fulﬁ  lment of its duties and when 
it so requests; they do not face any obligations 
regarding the conduct of their domestic policies 
with respect to multilateral surveillance or 
its outcome. 
In addition to a possible decision, new initiatives 
are also being introduced. One of these is the 
preparation of reports on outward spillovers 
from systemically large economies or groups 
of economies whose policies may impact on 
the stability of the IMS. Such surveillance 
involves consultation with members both where 
the spillovers originate and where they impact. 
It ﬁ  lls a useful gap in the Fund’s surveillance, 
since this focus exceeds the bounds, and the 
procedures, of customary bilateral surveillance. 
While spillovers could be addressed in the 
standard annual reviews of countries’ policies 
(known as Article IV consultations), there are 
clear advantages to preparing a separate report, 
in terms of both visibility of the issues and 
involving affected parties in the surveillance 
exercise. In practice, it may not always be 
clear where the policy action behind a spillover 
originated, for example, where a policy causing 
an outward spillover is in fact a reaction to an 
inward spillover from elsewhere. Nevertheless, 
unveiling response measures and discerning the 
degree of inﬂ  uence would be a useful exercise 
in itself to help understand the nature of 
cross-country inﬂ  uences. Indeed, by revealing 
the extent to which countries’ policies are 
already inﬂ   uenced by other countries, such 
reports may help break down resistance to 
greater policy coordination given that members’ 
policies already “intrude” on each other. 
Further improvements under discussion also 
turn attention to issues that extend beyond any 
single economy and promote “system thinking”, 
i.e. awareness of the linkages – and hence risk 
transmission – among economies and ﬁ  nancial 
sectors. The revival of multilateral consultation 
procedures (MCP) is being reconsidered.23 
The ﬁ  rst (and so far only) MCP was launched by the IMF in  23 
2006-07 with a view to addressing global imbalances while 
maintaining robust global growth. It represented the ﬁ  rst 
attempt to reconﬁ   gure surveillance of multilateral issues of 
systemic importance through collaborative and collective action. 
Its deﬁ  ning features were its speciﬁ  c focus on a key topic and 
the involvement of only the most relevant economies. Although 
useful in increasing the awareness of the issues facing the parties 
and crystallising policy options, the 2006/07 exercise was let 
down by the weak policy follow-up on the part of the parties.44
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Under an MCP, the Fund convenes meetings to 
promote dialogue among the participants, 
conducts discussions with them, provides 
analytical input and identiﬁ   es policy options. 
The participants are the key actors in the exercise 
(in contrast to the spillover reports, where the 
IMF is at the centre). They are required to 
provide the Fund with the information it requests 
for its analysis, participate in meetings, discuss 
policy adjustments and how to share them 
among the participants, and take the agreed 
policy measures. Post-crisis, the G20 MAP is 
seeking to coordinate on the general goal of 
global rebalancing, but there is a greater need 
than ever to address speciﬁ  c risks to IMS 
stability (e.g. a sustained rise in food prices) 
through collaborative and collective action. 
In this light, multilateral consultation procedures 
would be a useful tool on account of their ability 
to sharpen the focus on a particular issue, 
emphasise the beneﬁ   ts of joint action and 
provide a forum for joint action to be speciﬁ  ed 
and agreed. Ways could be considered to 
improve the policy action follow-up beyond 
simply monitoring implementation in subsequent 
Article IV surveillance exercises. (For example, 
there could be a section in the IMF’s WEO 
devoted to monitoring post-consultation policy 
efforts and developments in the issue that was 
the subject of the consultation). 
Efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the 
WEO and the Global Financial Stability Report 
(GFSR) are also under constant review, and 
most recently involve consideration of greater 
coverage of GFSR messages in Chapter 1 of 
the WEO. Further ideas include the preparation 
of a single, short document summarising the 
main insights of the WEO, GFSR and Fiscal 
Monitor, to synthesise and communicate the 
main policy messages to policy-makers. Finally, 
the Fund is also working on producing cross-
cutting thematic reports, drawing on Article IV 
surveillance, to promote understanding of cross-
country linkages. Such reports can complement 
the WEO with a policy-focused examination 
of lessons to be drawn from experiences of 
members facing similar circumstances. 
REGIONAL SURVEILLANCE
Multilateral surveillance does not have only 
a global dimension. Regional surveillance is 
also very important as it not only comprises 
the oversight of developments within a region 
as inﬂ  uenced by the activity of its individual 
economies, but also promotes the understanding 
of the economic and ﬁ  nancial  interactions 
between that region and the rest of the world. 
The IMF conducts regional surveillance and 
reports on its ﬁ  ndings  in  Regional Economic 
Outlooks. These reports usually do not ﬁ  nd the 
visibility they deserve, and regional surveillance 
by the Fund tends therefore to play a more minor 
role than it should. There is clear scope to raise 
the proﬁ  le of Regional Economic Outlooks with 
a view to developing a better understanding of 
the regions themselves and their relations with 
the rest of the world. In this way, they could 
be of more use in the preparation of the WEO 
and GFSR. 
At the same time, there remains scope for the 
Fund to improve its conceptualisation of the role 
of regional economic and ﬁ  nancial dynamics in 
global stability. For example, for too long, 
the IMF considered surveillance of the euro area 
as an input into the bilateral surveillance of their 
individual members, rather than recognising the 
importance of the euro area per se for the global 
economy.24 This in part reﬂ  ects the strong legal 
and operational inﬂ   uence of country-based 
membership on the design of IMF activities. 
In an important symbolic step, the IMF has 
recently set up a unit for euro area surveillance, 
which evidences an awareness of the importance 
of the region, surveillance of which has been 
constrained by past practices. 
IMF surveillance of the euro area is considered bilateral  24 
surveillance by the Fund on the grounds that (i) it is conducted  in 
order to feed into the bilateral surveillance of euro area members 
who are legally members of the IMF, unlike euro area bodies; 
and (ii) the counterparts represent the euro area as a whole, 
not as the sum of its members, and hence the euro area has the 
character of another economy, rather than as the aggregation of 
its members; hence the counterparts are single, not multiple as 
they would be if each member were represented in the talks.45
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To be sure, the IMF is neither the only nor the 
best-placed organisation to undertake regional 
surveillance.  Regional surveillance by other 
bodies tends to accord with the relative 
importance attached to the region by its 
members, and here the EU stands out. 
Surveillance by the EU is an important and well-
developed exercise, now being further 
strengthened following the report of the 
Van Rompuy Task Force in response to the 
major shortcomings highlighted by the 2010 
sovereign debt crisis. For countries that signed 
up in 2000 to the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) – 
a network of swap arrangements between the 
members of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN),25 China, Japan and Korea 
(also known as ASEAN+3) – surveillance has 
so far been low key, but this is set to change. 
The multilateralisation of the swap agreement 
under the Bali Agreement in May 2009 (CMIM) 
has increased the need for high quality 
regional surveillance. Members endorsed the 
development of regional cooperation beyond 
simple information sharing and peer review, 
which will entail the creation of an independent 
regional surveillance agency. By early 2011, 
an ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Surveillance 
Ofﬁ  ce (AMRO) in Singapore is to be established. 
It will underpin any lending undertaken under 
the CMIM, which has yet to be activated. 
Other regional bodies around the world also 
conduct regional surveillance to varying degrees, 
but visibility is low. 
IMPROVING THE ELEMENTS OF OVERSIGHT: 
(1) THE ACTIVE PURSUIT OF THE GLOBAL 
PUBLIC GOOD OF EXTERNAL STABILITY
In October 2010 the US Secretary of the 
Treasury, Timothy Geithner, wrote in a letter to 
his G20 colleagues that G20 countries “should 
commit to undertake policies consistent with 
reducing external imbalances (…) over the next 
few years, recognizing that some exceptions 
may be required”. In November 2010, following 
the discussions of this proposal, G20 leaders 
asked their ﬁ  nance ministers and central bank 
governors to discuss in the ﬁ  rst half of 2011 a 
set of indicative guidelines (to be composed of a 
range of indicators) to serve as a mechanism for 
the detection of large imbalances which call for 
corrective action. These indicative guidelines 
should be designed to take account of national 
and regional circumstances, including those of 
monetary unions. The G20 Framework Working 
Group, with the support of the IMF, was 
mandated to carry out the technical work and 
put forward a ﬁ  rst proposal to be endorsed in the 
ﬁ  rst half of 2011. 
The strength of this initiative is that it 
acknowledges that there is no single solution 
to the adjustment of global imbalances. Neither 
monetary, exchange rate, ﬁ  scal, nor structural 
policies sufﬁ   ce on their own. Moreover, the 
policy mix that is required is likely to differ 
considerably from country to country. This 
implies a need to consider all relevant policies 
in  all relevant systemic countries in the 
process of international cooperation aimed at 
rebalancing the global economy. In this context, 
the indicative guidelines serve as a detection 
mechanism for broader analysis – something 
which will avoid ﬁ  nger-pointing at one policy 
and one country or economic area. 
In this way, the approach endorsed by G20 
leaders has the potential to provide a common 
playing  ﬁ   eld that allows each country to 
indicate, quantify and offer up for scrutiny the 
whole package of policy measures that it intends 
to pursue as a contribution to external stability. 
It makes it easier to address the aforementioned 
risk of asymmetric adjustment between surplus 
and deﬁ  cit countries. And it may help generate 
greater traction of the G20 MAP and IMF 
surveillance processes. 
At the same time, the initiative has to be well 
understood and implemented properly by all 
those involved, otherwise it risks producing 
negative unintended consequences. At the time 
of  ﬁ   nalisation of this paper, two open issues 
stand out. 
ASEAN: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,  25 
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Vietnam.46
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A ﬁ  rst issue concerns the broad principles with 
which the guidelines should comply. In the view 
of the authors, the following principles should 
be observed: 
Principle 1   •  – The indicative guidelines should 
strike the right balance between parsimony 
and comprehensiveness, i.e. ﬁ  nding the right 
trade-off between (i) selecting a relatively 
limited number of indicators capturing the 
most relevant dimensions of imbalances, 
while (ii) ensuring that the set of measures 
adequately detects imbalances to trigger 
subsequent, more thorough analysis in order 
to identify from the full range of policies 
those that are most appropriate for reducing 
the imbalance. This principle acknowledges 
that there is no one-size-ﬁ  ts-all measure of 
imbalances. The pros and cons of several 
indicators need to be assessed, including 
quantitative and qualitative, external and 
domestic, real and ﬁ  nancial,  ofﬁ  cial  and 
private sector, level/stock and change/ﬂ  ow 
indicators. At the same time, the design of 
a mechanism based on an economic reading 
of indicators and economic analysis for 
signalling excessive imbalances should 
remain straightforward. The indicative 
guidelines should constitute a relatively 
simple and understandable communication 
tool that is easy to revise and update when 
necessary. While the guidelines should serve 
as a detection mechanism to identify the 
economies for deeper analysis, it should be 
the subsequent analysis, not the detection 
mechanism per se, which provides the basis 
for policy recommendations. 
Principle 2   •  – To the extent possible, 
the indicative guidelines and, at any rate, 
the subsequent, more thorough analysis 
should allow for country- and monetary 
union speciﬁ   cities. Hence the guidelines 
need to be tailored accordingly. 
Principle 3   •  – The analysis and assessment 
triggered by the indicative guidelines should 
also envisage a time frame for adjustment and 
thereby facilitate the monitoring of progress 
towards the benchmarks. Since policy-makers 
have limited control in the short run over 
variables such as the current account – 
especially when structural reforms are 
required, the “initial conditions” of a 
country or economic area need to be taken 
into account by the G20 in the discussion. 
In essence, there should be an assessment 
of whether structural reforms sufﬁ  ce for a 
particular country (in which case results will 
take time to show), or whether other policy 
measures are needed for the short term. 
Even if “only” structural policies are needed, 
their crucial importance for a more balanced 
global economy should be fully recognised 
(see e.g. de Mello and Padoan 2010). 
The way forward requires identifying lines 
of action that can start immediately, which 
then have to be properly implemented and 
monitored over time. The timeframe should 
be as short as possible to shore up global 
stability, but as long as necessary for the 
country to realistically effect implementation 
and for the reforms to produce results. 
This will call for careful judgement. 
A second issue open to discussion is the extent 
to which the exchange rate variable should be 
accorded a signiﬁ  cant role in the design of the 
guidelines. On the one hand, a focus on the role 
of exchange rates within the broad multilateral 
process of global adjustment recognises that 
misalignments (including those partly as a 
result of “manipulation”) may have serious 
repercussions at both the global and the domestic 
level. On the other hand, one lesson that could 
be drawn from past experience is that a 
one-sided emphasis on exchange rates may have 
tended to foster a perception that this was the 
only decisive variable in international economic 
relations. At times this may have led to an 
unnecessary dramatisation of communication in 
international relations, whereas both academic 
research and historical experience have shown 
that exchange rate movements – even sizeable 47
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ones – are not necessarily the most important 
element in the adjustment of unsustainable 
balance-of-payments positions.27 
It is interesting to note that also the IMF’s 
emphasis on exchange rates in its bilateral 
surveillance has evolved in recent years. 
Already prior to 2010, especially since 
the Bilateral Surveillance Guidance Note 
released in November 2009 (which reﬁ  ned 
the operationalisation of the 2007 Decision 
on Bilateral Surveillance Over Members’ 
Policies), the Fund centred surveillance more 
strongly and concretely than in the past on the 
concept of external stability (similar to the G20 
concept of external sustainability), in which the 
exchange rate plays an important but modiﬁ  ed 
role, i.e. it is one of the variables whose 
adjustment is required to ensure the stability of 
the international monetary system. Accordingly, 
IMF surveillance activities now make an effort 
to assess all policies of a country that inﬂ  uence 
the present or prospective contribution to 
external stability. 
The IMF continues to conduct another regular 
exercise, the CGER reports on equilibrium 
exchange rates. The semi-annual estimates 
of equilibrium real effective exchange rates 
(REERs) by the Consultative Group on 
Exchange Rate Issues (CGER) highlight 
the degree of possible misalignment of each 
currency. In so doing, they provide a useful 
indication of how much exchange rates need 
to adjust to regain external stability all other 
policies being equal. This approach faces two 
difﬁ   culties, however. First, the discussion of 
exchange rate misalignments should logically 
follow, rather than being disconnected from the 
consideration of whether and how the whole 
range of economic policies has been promoting 
external stability. This is indeed the approach 
implicitly taken by the G20 MAP and related 
indicative guidelines. Second, exchange rates 
are a policy instrument only for non-freely 
ﬂ  oating currencies – and even then, it may be 
argued that the REER variable is over the longer 
run largely endogenous in nature. 
These considerations suggest that a more 
promising avenue may in future be that of using, 
as part of the Fund’s bilateral and multilateral 
surveillance, the benchmark estimates of 
sustainable current account positions and other 
indicative guidelines as agreed and “owned” 
by the countries participating in the G20 MAP. 
From a political viewpoint, this link between 
G20 MAP and IMF surveillance may help put 
IMF discussions on exchange rates into an even 
more focused context. 
IMPROVING THE ELEMENTS OF OVERSIGHT: 
(2) DAMPENING THE NON-PRECAUTIONARY 
DEMAND FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES
As noted above, a very large share of world 
reserves is being accumulated for non-
precautionary reasons – mainly, for example, as 
a by-product of the maintenance of a persistently 
undervalued exchange rate. The FSN 
liquidity instruments and other instruments 
discussed in Section 2.2 are not relevant to 
the dampening of this type of demand for 
reserves. At the same time, a focus on changing 
the exchange rate regime has proven too 
narrow and simplistic. Rather, supplementary, 
multilateral approaches are needed to dampen 
non-precautionary reserve demand, for example, 
the following: 
First, in its    • bilateral surveillance the 
IMF could take a more critical look at the 
non-precautionary drivers of reserve 
accumulation, especially in systemic 
countries. Currently, the issue of reserve 
accumulation is barely mentioned in 
Article IV reports, and paradoxically the 
IMF pays more attention to this issue in its 
surveillance over smaller countries.28 
For instance, Fratzscher, Juvenal and Sarno (2007) show that  26 
equity market and housing price shocks have been more important 
determinants of the US current account than exchange rate 
movements in the past. In the same vein, Chinn and Wei (2010) 
ﬁ   nd no strong, robust or monotonic relation between ﬂ  exible 
exchange rate regimes and current account reversals. Others 
(e.g. Farrant and Peersman 2006) have even argued that ﬂ  oating 
exchange rates are more a source of shocks than a shock absorber.
The Independent Evaluation Ofﬁ  ce is embarking on a study of  27 
IMF advice on international reserves.48
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Second, the aforementioned new    • spillover 
reports which the IMF plans to produce 
in the coming months for ﬁ  ve  systemic 
economies, including China, would be 
well-suited to highlighting how China’s 
reserve accumulation may affect global 
and regional stability. Moreover, the IMF 
intends to produce thematic multi-country 
reports, one of which may focus on reserve 
accumulation with an emphasis on its 
longer-term costs and risks. 
Third, efforts towards greater transparency    •
of reserves could be stepped up. Measures 
should be taken to (i) ensure that countries 
provide accurate information when 
complying with their obligation to report 
the nature of their exchange rate regime 
to the IMF and (ii) move towards greater 
disclosure of the currency composition of 
ofﬁ   cial foreign exchange reserves, which 
remains voluntary. Voluntary reporting 
is inappropriate given that only reported 
reserves determine the characteristics and 
value of the SDR. 
Fourth, in the context of the    • G20 MAP the 
implications of a marked slowdown in 
the process of reserve accumulation could 
be discussed as part of alternative policy 
scenarios for achieving strong, sustainable 
and balanced growth. 
Fifth, assessing the    • adequacy of foreign 
reserves clearly remains an area open 
to further research. Depending on how 
convincing the “second generation” indicators 
are, they might be usefully employed in the 
policy debate. In this regard, it should be 
borne in mind that IMF staff members have 
already used a variety of measures to assess 
reserve adequacy in Article IV reports on 
smaller countries. The IMF is continuing 
to work on this issue has already come up 
with concrete suggestions, including a new 
risk-weighted approach (see Box 3). 
Box 3
MEASURING RESERVE OPTIMALITY
Should the IMF develop advanced measures of the optimality of foreign exchange reserves, 
possibly as part of its surveillance activities and the provision of technical support to the G20 
process?
Mileva (2010), from which this box is drawn, raises the question of the appropriateness of 
conventional reserve adequacy benchmarks. Regarding the ratio of coverage of three months of 
imports, several emerging market economies have been liberalising their ﬁ  nancial accounts since 
the 1990s. Hence they have been increasingly exposed to large and volatile capital ﬂ  ows, which 
makes the trade-related reserve adequacy yardstick insufﬁ  cient. The Greenspan-Guidotti rule has 
in turn been criticised because short-term debt is not the only type of capital ﬂ  ow which is highly 
volatile. Moreover, countries are subject to capital ﬂ  ight originated not only by non-residents 
but also by their own residents. For this reason Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2009) have 
argued in favour of monitoring the ratio of reserves to M2 (i.e. the amount of domestic ﬁ  nancial 
liabilities that could potentially be converted into foreign currency). 
Model-based adequacy measures, on the other hand, include several additional factors, such as 
the fall in output in crisis periods, the crisis-prevention role of reserves and sudden stops in capital 
ﬂ  ows. These estimates, however, depend crucially on the assumptions made about the model 49
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parameters (e.g. risk aversion, probability 
of a crisis), while there is no agreement on 
the measurement of variables such as the 
opportunity cost of holding reserves and the 
degree of substitutability between owned and 
borrowed reserves. 
More speciﬁ   cally, the latest research on 
precautionary demand for international 
reserves relies on models which maximise the 
welfare of a representative agent in an economy 
subject to a fall in output and a sudden stop in 
capital inﬂ  ows. In Aizenman and Lee (2007), 
Caballero and Pangeas (2005), Jeanne (2007), Durdu, Mendoza and Terrones (2007) and Jeanne 
and Rancière (2008), reserves represent an insurance policy against a “bad state of nature”. 
If a crisis occurs, its negative impact is alleviated by running down reserves. The “optimal” 
level of reserves derived in these models could be higher than under the Greenspan-Guidotti rule 
(i.e. reserves should be greater than short-term external debt), because reserves mitigate the 
adverse welfare effect not only of the debt rollover crisis but also of the fall in output on domestic 
consumption.
In Jeanne (2007), Jeanne and Rancière (2008) and Kim (2008), reserves are used for crisis 
prevention in addition to crisis mitigation. The probability of a crisis in these models is a 
decreasing function of the ratio of international reserves to short-term debt, i.e. the accumulation 
of reserves increases investor conﬁ  dence in the country’s ability to repay its external debt 
obligations and thus reduces the probability of a sudden stop in capital ﬂ  ows. Because the 
probability of a crisis is endogenous to the stock of reserves, the optimal level of reserves may 
even exceed the “full insurance” level of reserves (i.e. reserves should be greater than short-term 
external debt plus a fall in output).1 
Calibrations of several of the models cited above produce optimal reserves-to-GDP ratios that 
range between 8% and 30% (Table). 
IMF staff members have used the model by Jeanne and Rancière to complement reserve adequacy 
assessments for a few individual small economies. Most recently, a new risk-weighted metric 
has been developed and should soon feed into a staff paper.
All in all, assessing the adequacy of foreign reserves clearly remains an area open to further 
research. Depending on how convincing the “second generation” indicators are, they might be 
usefully employed in the policy debate. 
1  Aizenman and Sun (2009) show that countries which accumulate reserves for self-insurance against capital outﬂ  ows (rather than trade 
deﬁ  cits) refrained from sizable reserve depletion during the latest crisis.
Optimal level of reserves for self-insurance – 
model predictions
Study Optimal reserves-to-GDP ratio
Caballero and Pangeas 
(2005) up to 18%
Durdu, Mendoza 
and Terrones (2007) 6%-26%
Jeanne (2007) 7.7% if only crisis mitigation
23% if crisis prevention
Jeanne and Rancière 
(2008)
9.1% if only crisis mitigation
8%-over 30% if crisis prevention
Kim (2008) 10%-30%50
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IMPROVING THE ELEMENTS OF OVERSIGHT: 
(3) FINANCIAL SECTOR LINKAGES 
The crisis made clear that ﬁ  nancial  sector 
surveillance sorely lagged developments, that 
the understanding of macro-ﬁ  nancial  linkages 
(deﬁ  ned as the linkages between ﬁ  nancial market 
activity and macroeconomic developments) was 
weak, and that macro-prudential linkages (the 
links between prudential regulations for ﬁ  nancial 
institutions and macroeconomic developments) 
were barely considered. 
Part of the problem was a mismatch between the 
national locus of supervisory responsibility and 
the international arena of ﬁ  nancial markets and 
economic interaction. A central institution or 
forum was needed to concentrate on addressing 
these issues, and the G20 was quick to identify 
the Financial Stability Forum as best placed to 
be that locus. It was overhauled for this task, by 
means of a broadened mandate to better promote 
ﬁ  nancial stability, an expanded membership and 
a name change to the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB). As a consequence, it now functions as 
the umbrella organisation for relevant fora such 
as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
and a long list of others (including the 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, 
the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors, International Accounting 
Standards Committee, the International 
Association of Deposit Insurers and Global 
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information). Importantly, it has been made 
the overarching body in charge of coordinating 
ﬁ   nancial stability issues, including standard-
setting and rule-making at the global level. 
A key feature of the FSB work programme is 
its collaboration with other institutions. In part 
this reﬂ   ects the importance of cooperating to 
address internationally interlinked sources 
of risk. At the same time, it also reﬂ  ects the 
limited resources of the FSB, which limit how 
much it can accomplish directly. It collaborates 
with the IMF in the ﬁ  eld of macro-prudential 
surveillance. Their main joint activity is 
the “Early Warning Exercise”, which does 
not aim to predict crises but rather to ﬂ  ag 
vulnerabilities (including macroeconomic and 
ﬁ   nancial vulnerabilities), giving emphasis to 
cross-sectoral and cross-border interlinkages. 
Better described as a “systemic risk assessment”, 
it focuses on low-probability, high-impact risks, 
using a combination of quantitative analysis and 
qualitative judgement. The results are reported 
semi-annually to the International Monetary 
and Financial Committee (IMFC) of the IMF. 
The IMF and FSB are also together developing 
guidelines to assist national authorities ascertain 
whether  ﬁ  nancial institutions, instruments and 
markets are systemically important. This work 
is now advanced and has spawned efforts to 
improve the collection of relevant data. Besides 
the IMF, the FSB is also working with regulatory 
bodies to develop recommendations to mitigate 
pro-cyclicality, and with the BIS and accounting-
standard-setters to develop macro-prudential 
tools. It will take time for new coordination and 
collaboration procedures to become established, 
but the process is under way, and represents the 
“globalisation” of surveillance and supervision 
that is necessary in order to parallel global 
ﬁ  nancial and economic activity. 
The IMF, with its mandate for promoting the 
stability of the international monetary system, 
has moved gradually over the years to covering 
ﬁ  nancial markets in its surveillance. The crisis 
has strengthened the case for a stronger 
role for the Fund in ﬁ  nancial  surveillance. 
The IMF/World Bank Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (FSAP) is being overhauled 
to sharpen the focus on vulnerabilities, 
conduct more regular monitoring through 
a modular approach to surveillance and 
off-site monitoring, and ensure a more thorough 
follow-up of recommendations. Already work is 
under way to better integrate FSAP results into 
Article IV reports, and importantly, stability 
assessments under FSAPs have been made 
a mandatory part of Article IV surveillance 
for members with systemically important 
ﬁ   nancial sectors. These steps are useful and 
welcome, but it should be borne in mind that 
they cannot be a panacea for all shortcomings 
in ﬁ  nancial surveillance, and will form part of 51
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a more comprehensive effort to keep abreast of 
developments, and thereby risks, in ﬁ  nancial 
markets. 
The crisis exposed gaps in data, especially with 
regard to ﬁ  nancial markets, which the IMF now 
seeks to remedy. Under discussion is access 
to timely data on debt, derivatives, foreign 
exchange market exposures and cross-border 
banking exposures. IMF surveillance could 
beneﬁ  t from deeper engagement with key global 
ﬁ   nancial institutions. Only with appropriate 
information will it be in a position to assess 
the spillovers transmitting through global 
ﬁ   nancial networks and their implications for 
macro-ﬁ  nancial stability. 
IMF surveillance needs to become more dynamic 
to capture the build-up of risk, the spread 
of  ﬁ   nancial activity and the transmission of 
contagion. In a useful initiative, the Fund is 
constructing a global ﬁ  nancial risk map, with 
a geographic element, to track the build-up 
of systemic risks. The aim is to understand 
cross-border  ﬁ   nancial connections, so as to 
identify where risks may develop and how 
ﬁ   nancial and policy shocks propagate across 
markets and economies. By examining 
ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ   ows and exposures across asset 
classes and maturities, and mapping the 
process of transmission though global ﬁ  nancial 
networks, it should be possible to see how the 
functioning of the system may be disrupted by 
stress in particular segments or areas. Mapping 
interconnectedness constitutes an innovation 
that helps visualise and conceptualise the 
workings of global ﬁ  nancial markets. 
2.3.2 IMPROVING OVERSIGHT: TOWARDS GREATER 
“TRACTION” 
Improvements in the identiﬁ  cation of risks to 
global stability and sustainable growth are of 
limited usefulness unless there is follow-up 
policy action by the relevant authorities. 
Failure to implement corrective policy action 
to address known risks was a key weakness of 
the surveillance process prior to the onset of the 
crisis. This is because national authorities are 
accountable only to their domestic constituencies 
and are under no obligation to act in the global 
interest. Hence, policy recommendations suffer 
from a lack of traction. This has long been a 
core weakness of the current IMS. 
Part of the difﬁ  culty stems from ignorance as to 
the causes of inaction. Each cause may require 
a different course of action to address it. Several 
reasons for inaction are conceivable. Here we 
consider four, which is not an exhaustive list. 
First, views may diverge between the local 
authorities and the reviewing body (such as the 
IMF) as to whether there is a problem, the cause 
of the problem and the appropriate policy 
action. In such a case, deeper analysis, including 
drawing on other viewpoints, might help 
resolve the differences. Second, the authorities 
may share the views of the reviewing body but 
face capacity constraints in implementing the 
remedial action. One way forward here would 
be for external assistance to be provided to 
overcome these constraints. Third, and very 
importantly, the authorities may face political 
constraints stemming from the short-term costs 
of policy action – especially when these costs 
fall on sectors with inﬂ  uential lobbies. In this 
case, a more independent IMF (and institutions 
in charge of regional surveillance) “appealing 
more directly to the people than to their leaders” 
(Rajan 2010) might help develop a public debate 
going beyond relations with governmental 
bodies only. The greater transparency of the 
policy discussion and increased media attention 
might eventually prove successful, although 
there is of course a risk of it also hardening 
resistance, depending on inﬂ   uences on the 
public debate. Finally, and of most relevance 
for those policies where the global beneﬁ  ts are 
large, the authorities may be indifferent to the 
recommended policy actions, perhaps because 
the domestic beneﬁ  t only marginally outweighs 
the domestic cost, or because they may deplete 
political capital. In such cases, increased peer 
pressure, preferably from other members of the 
same forum (e.g. the G20) and from other fora, 
could help spur action. 
Understanding the reasons for recommendations 
being ignored could help in the designing of 52
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speciﬁ  c methods to improve traction. Depending 
on the institutional set-up of each international 
or regional arrangement, the type of pressure 
behind recommendations for members could 
range from a soft power mode (e.g. in the 
G20) to a hard mode (EU). While hard rules 
promise greater compliance, they are no 
guarantee. Soft power, by its nature, exerts 
pressure only on voluntary actions, and can 
only work if supported by the relevant policy-
makers. Sometimes it can achieve results 
despite the absence of hard obligations, since 
it can encourage a shift n the direction of more 
appropriate policies or voluntary standards that 
may gather pace as they spread, eventually 
isolating non-compliant countries. Yet the soft 
power approach has clear limitations. The use 
of incentives, both positive and negative, can 
help, but this assumes a capacity to reward and 
punish accordingly that is frequently absent. 
Media or public pressure may focus the minds 
of policy-makers, but enhancing transparency 
to the extent that the relevant groups become 
sufﬁ  ciently alerted to the issues may be difﬁ  cult. 
Peer pressure (including naming and shaming) 
should help in theory but in practice is often 
relatively weak. 
THE IMF AND BILATERAL POLICY ADVICE 
TO MEMBERS 
The IMF has no authority to impose 
policies on its members, but must rely on 
other, softer, methods. It has long sought to 
improve the implementation rate of its policy 
recommendations, mostly through improving its 
analysis, its method of engaging with members 
and the justiﬁ  cation for its advice. The results 
have been disappointing, however, as in the 
aforementioned cases of the 2006/07 multilateral 
consultation and FSAPs. In response to the 
IMF’s bilateral surveillance, the authorities 
under review not infrequently act slowly or 
indecisively in addressing the weaknesses 
identiﬁ  ed. 
The crisis has offered a new impetus to 
this endeavour, and new ideas are being 
discussed. One suggestion is to ensure top level 
engagement in the surveillance procedure by 
better involving ministers and their ministerial 
bodies through strengthening the IMFC or even 
the creation of an International Monetary and 
Financial Board. This would permit use of the 
so far under-exploited principle of “comply or 
explain”. Here, the authorities of the country 
under surveillance would be expected to discuss 
the extent of their adherence to the policy advice 
from the last consultation exercise. This could 
be covered in a box or section in the staff report, 
or alternatively as a regular sub-section of the 
document issued by the authorities for the IMF 
Executive Board meeting. This practice should 
have the effect of drawing attention to the 
degree to which IMF advice was followed, and 
exposing the reasons where it was not. This may 
help reveal the causes of non-compliance and 
inform efforts to improve both the quality of the 
advice and the degree of adherence. 
There also remains scope to increase the 
leverage on public and peer pressure through 
greater transparency. Already, the Fund has 
moved to a practice of publishing Article IV 
reports by default, requiring countries to object 
if publication is not to go ahead. This represents 
the latest in a series of steps moving from no 
publication without the authority’s request, 
to assumed publication, to automatic publication 
unless the member objects. This advancement 
has taken place even though publication 
remains voluntary, and illustrates the scope for 
improvements via soft pressure. In addition, 
IMF staff now regularly holds a press conference 
upon conclusion of the consultations before the 
Executive Board meeting, and there is increasing 
pressure to move to publication of the Article IV 
report in advance of, or simultaneously with, 
the Executive Board meeting to preserve 
its integrity. Following the Board meeting, 
a Public Information Notice (PIN) is usually 
published, though not before the authorities of 
the country under surveillance have reviewed 
it. It may be worth considering referring PINs 
to a separate independent review group of 
experienced non-partisan professionals – instead 
of the authorities – for the task of vetting it for 
insensitivities and inaccuracies This would 
enhance IMF independence and remove any 53
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perception of political interference in its policy 
recommendations. 
Last but not least, a set of “pillar countries” 
could be identiﬁ   ed, and subjected to, for 
example, more scrutiny, more frequent reviews, 
compulsory FSAPs (see below), and more 
stringent follow-up to policy recommendations 
in order to better address their systemic 
implications. 
ADHERENCE TO POLICIES AIMED AT GLOBAL 
REBALANCING AND SUSTAINABLE GLOBAL 
GROWTH
The G20 process of mutual policy assessment 
for strong, sustainable and balanced growth is 
not only a new type of surveillance procedure 
but also represents the most promising initiative 
in many years to achieve traction in areas 
where IMF policy recommendations have gone 
largely unheeded. Besides obvious reasons 
for scepticism, there are at least three grounds 
for optimism. 
First, by setting up this process the G20 is 
focussing attention on the issue of growth 
rebalancing, adding political momentum and, 
most importantly, making itself accountable 
at every summit meeting for progress in this 
realm. Crucially, the leaders themselves are 
taking ownership of the framework and thereby 
signalling top-level commitment to the exercise. 
Second, the process is more transparent for the 
international community, the public and the 
IMF Executive Board than the previous IMF 
multilateral consultation, which should help 
leverage the leaders’ commitment. 
Third, the range of participants is closer to 
optimal, as it is broader than in the multilateral 
consultations, while the number of interlocutors 
is limited, to include only major advanced 
and emerging market economies. This should 
improve the relevance and visibility of the 
exercise, and the manageability of the discussions. 
Of course, it is important to remain realistic 
about what this process can achieve. For one 
thing, recommendations risk being unspeciﬁ  c 
as they are issued to groups, not individual 
members, and there are no sanctions or penalties 
for non-compliance. In addition, G20 members 
pledged their commitment to the process at 
the height of the crisis. It remains to be seen 
whether the same level of commitment is 
evident as economies start to recover and the 
sense of urgency subsides. It should also be 
remembered that the Leaders’ Statement from 
the 2009 Pittsburgh Summit emphasises that 
G20 members bear primary responsibility for 
the sound management of their economies, 
which underscores the limits of G20 pressure 
(and global governance in general). It also 
remains to be seen how long the G20 will enjoy 
its current authority, given that its legitimacy 
may be challenged as the urgency of addressing 
the crisis subsides. Notwithstanding these 
concerns, the G20 MAP remains the most 
promising initiative to increase policy action for 
the global good in many years. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICIES AND ADHERENCE 
TO STANDARDS IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
Regarding surveillance of countries’ ﬁ  nancial 
sectors, participation in an FSAP remained 
voluntary until very recently. Although more 
complete coverage under the FSAP would not 
have headed off the crisis, it may at least have 
made the relevant authorities a little more 
vigilant in overseeing activities in the ﬁ  nancial 
sector. It is not surprising, therefore, that calls 
for FSAPS and regular updates to be made 
mandatory increased after the crisis and have 
led to 25 countries with systemically important 
ﬁ   nancial sectors being obliged to include the 
ﬁ  nancial stability assessment under the FSAP as 
a regular part of their Article IV surveillance. 
The transformation of the FSF into the 
FSB has helped to increase pressure on 
authorities responsible for ﬁ  nancial  sector 
issues. A potentially important component 
of the broadened mandate of the FSB is the 
commitment of all its members to undergo 
periodic peer reviews. These will be based on, 
among other reports, public IMF/World Bank 
FSAP reports. The FSB is to elaborate and report 54
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on recommendations made in these reports and 
their follow up. Given that the review of the 
FSAP process by the IMF Executive Board in 
2009 recognised that recommendations were 
inadequately followed up, the FSB can fulﬁ  l 
a useful role in this context. The FSB’s peer 
reviews are not only to focus on individual 
countries; they may also be thematic 
(i.e. monitoring the implementation across 
members of particular polices or standards 
agreed within the FSB). 
Second, the FSB has set up a process of 
monitoring compliance with international 
regulatory and supervisory standards on 
international cooperation and information 
sharing, known as a “non-cooperative 
jurisdiction” (NCJ) process. This exercise 
extends beyond the membership to have global 
reach. Where there are shortcomings, the FSB 
highlights “jurisdictions for further evaluation”, 
and draws on assessments by the IMF and 
the World Bank of compliance with FSAP 
recommendations or Reports on Observance 
of Standards and Codes (ROSCs). This is 
to introduce an incentive system to induce 
jurisdictions to keep up with reforms. 
Third, the FSB has set up an Implementation 
Monitoring Network to monitor compliance 
with G20 and FSB recommendations. This is 
a useful way to keep the focus on countries’ 
implementation records. Although ROSCs 
and FSAP recommendations are supported 
only by non-binding soft law, they may spread 
good practice, which may gradually become 
standard practice, breaking down resistance to 
their hardening into obligations and isolating 
non-cooperative countries.
2.4  LONGER-TERM MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 
SHAPING THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
SYSTEM
While in this second part of the paper we 
have dwelt mainly on policy-driven initiatives 
aimed at strengthening the IMS, one should 
not overlook the importance that market 
developments can have in shaping the IMS over 
the longer run. 
Domestic  ﬁ   nancial development in emerging 
market economies is in our view the most 
important of such developments. As discussed 
in Section 1.2.5, if ﬁ  nancial globalisation were 
to become more even in nature this would 
create incentives for policy discipline in the 
IMS: the excesses that characterised the mixed 
system prior to the crisis would no longer be 
possible in a context where creditors not only 
worry about the ability of debtors to repay 
their debt but also have credible investment 
alternatives. 
Also, the possible evolution towards a more 
multipolar currency system – discussed 
in Section 2.1.1 – should be seen as the 
indirect outcome not only of policy decisions 
(e.g. capital ﬂ   ow liberalisation, greater 
exchange rate ﬂ   exibility where needed and 
sound policies in general) but also of genuine 
market developments (e.g. private demand 
for international currencies and the deepening 
and reduced segmentation of certain capital 
markets). 
Finally, it should be recognised that, even 
though they are very painful and costly, ﬁ  nancial 
crises have, very often in history, taught lessons 
that have in hindsight been the main trigger 
for beneﬁ  cial IMS reforms. The recent crisis is 
proving to be no exception.55
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